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THE EXCESSIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL 
RULE 15(c) AND ITS LESSONS FOR CIVIL 
RULES REVISIONt 
Harold S. Lewis, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
What role remains for traditional doctrinal analysis? Bounded on 
one side by the nee-nihilism of critical legal studies, and on the other 
by the unabashedly "cold-blooded"1 latter-day Darwinism of law and 
economics, can traditional analysts still make a valuable contribution? 
In the midst of these curve-ball throwing southpaws and hard-throw-
ing right-handers, can today's leftover Langdellians2 serve out their 
years with dignity as respected utility players? 
This case study of one Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is designed 
to suggest affirmative answers to these questions. My focus is on the 
surprisingly extensive body of case law, culminating in the Supreme 
Court's 1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune, 3 that parses the second 
sentence of Federal Rule 15(c).4 Added in 1966, that sentence at-
t Copyright © 1987 by Harold S. Lewis, Jr. 
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My thanks to Dean Paul D. Carrington, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil' 
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1. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 171 (1985). 
2. Judge Posner equates traditional doctrinal analysis with the "nineteenth-century formalist 
thinking of Dean Langdell." Id. at 324. 
3. 106 s. Ct. 2379 (1986). 
4. FED. R. Ctv. P. 15(c). The Rule states: 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted 
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has re-
ceived such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against 
him. 
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the 
Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a 
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with re-
1507 
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tempts to set standards for the rel~tion back of party-changing amend-
ments to pleadings. A more prototypically pedestrian, less 
prepossessing topic of the traditionalist type could scarcely be 
imagined. Yet a review of its history brings larger points into sharp 
relief: something is seriously amiss in our Federal Rules amending 
process, and the costs of stasis are high. 
More particularly, I hope to show that the management or mis-
management of the Federal Rules promulgation and amendment pro-
cess has significant caseload implications; that the cumbersome 
complex of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the 
United States has failed to stay abreast of litigation developments that 
warrant consideration of Rules amendments; that the Court could im-
prove the process marginally by serving as a better sentinel, systemati-
cally identifying needed changes in the Rules; but finally, that the 
Court, even with its extensive drafting support team, needs assistance 
in its role as principal promulgator of Federal Rules amendments. 
These ideas are not new. A decade ago acute judicial5 and aca-
demic6 observers cited important institutional and practical objections 
to a rulemaking scheme which, then as now, was left to the initiative 
and discretion of the Supreme Court. Yet it is a timeworn office of 
traditional doctrinal scholarship to iterate, 7 to survey the results of 
developments in the most recent reporting period and remind the 
bench, the bar, and the legislature (if it is listening) that accumulated 
experience has confirmed previously noted imperfections in our law or 
procedures. 
Twenty checkered years of experience with the 1966 amendment 
to Federal Rule 15(c) vividly highlight the flabbiness of the Supreme 
Court's oversight of the Federal Rules. A review of that history gives 
fresh bite to the long-standing criticisms of the rules-revision process. 
It suggests that there are some issues, properly the subject of federal 
civil rulemaking, on which after a point repetitive litigation sheds in-
sufficient light to justify its costs. On these issues, additional rulemak-
ing would be far more efficient and no less fair. The same history also 
suggests that the current institutional rulemaking machinery is plainly 
spect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a 
defendant. 
5. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 16 CoLUM. L. REV. 905, 
933-38 (1976). 
6. Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time/or Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 
(1975). 
7. Even Judge Posner, perhaps the best-known exponent of applying economic analysis to 
substantive and institutional legal issues, opines that there is seldom a discovery of anything new 
in legal scholarship, as opposed to scholarship in the social sciences. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 
327-28. 
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inadequate to the task of initiating needed proposals for the study of 
particular rules. While the most obvious answer - direct legislative 
intervention in the rulemaking process - is probably not the best one, 
it is ultimately the responsibility of Congress to reassess the entire pro-
cess and remedy its deficiencies. 
Part I briefly surveys the respective areas of responsibility for fed-
eral civil rulemaking that the Court and the Congress have exercised 
since the Rules' adoption in 1938. Part II is an extended review, in five 
sections, of the history of rule 15(c) before and, most tellingly, after its 
amendment in 1966. Part III, returning to the roles of the Court and 
the Congress, considers the lessons of the history of rule 15(c) for the 
rules-revision process. 
l. FEDERAL CIVIL RULEMAKING: CONGRESS FINALLY STICKS A 
FOOT IN THE DOOR OF !TS OWN HOUSE 
It is no longer seriously questioned that the ultimate authority to 
establish federal civil procedural rules resides in Congress. 8 True to 
this conception, it is a statute, the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,9 which 
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate general civil rules, re-
serving to Congress the final authority to alter or veto rules the Court 
proposes. Shortly after Congress approved the Supreme Court's com-
prehensive blueprint of federal civil rules in 1938, the Court paid re-
ciprocal homage to the Congress. It acknowledged Congress' 
"undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of the fed-
eral courts" and to "exercise that power by delegating to this or other 
federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the stat-
utes or constitution of the United States."10 
The federal civil rulemaking function has since "been delegated al-
most entirely to the courts; Congress' power over the area has been 
reduced to a monitoring status."11 Subsequent legislation has further 
cemented the Supreme Court's preeminent position. For example, 
Congress has commanded the Judicial Conference of the United States 
to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the gen-
eral rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court."12 The Conference is then directed to 
submit its recommendations for rules changes or additions "to the 
8. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 905 & n.2, 906, 927, 929; see Wright, Procedural Reform: Its 
Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 565, 569-70 (1967). 
9. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982). 
10. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). 
11. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 927. 
12. 28 u.s.c. § 331 (1982). 
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Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, modification or re-
jection in accordance with law."13 Moreover, the Chief Justice sub-
stantially influences the rules-amending process by determining 
membership on the key Judicial Conference committees that are 
charged with rulemaking responsibility. He appoints the members of 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which prepares the initial 
draft of proposed rules changes, as well as the members of the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which reviews and 
approves the Advisory Committee's draft before forwarding it to the 
Conference as a whole. Fj.nal proposals acceptable to the entire Judi-
cial Conference are then presented to the Court for its approval and 
submission to Congress, as the Rules Enabling Act prescribes. 14 
Equally significant is the passive role of Congress once the Court 
signs off on proposed rules amendments. Under the Rules Enabling 
Act, proposed amendments reported to Congress by the Chief Justice 
no later than May 1 of a regular session of Congress will, "ninety days 
after they have been thus reported," take effect automatically. 15 And, 
until recently, that is what invariably happened. In 1982, however, 
Congress finally balked at a Supreme Court proposal for a Federal 
Rules amendment. It first delayed the proposed effective date16 and 
then altogether scotched17 proposed amendments to Federal Rule 4 
which the Chief Justice had transmitted to the Congress earlier that 
year. 18 This reassertion of congressional authority, without precedent 
in the arena of federal procedural rulemaking since the Rules Enabling 
Act was adopted in 1934, 19 came in response to "numerous com-
plaints" received by the House Committee on the Judiciary about a 
Supreme Court proposal to make service by mail the primary method 
of service of process.20 In the end Congress amended Federal Rule 4 
directly, substituting its own scheme of mail service for that proposed 
13. 28 u.s.c. § 331 (1982). 
14. For a description of the rules-amending and -approval process, see generally Weinstein, 
supra note 5, at 908-09; Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SocY., 250, 253 (1963); Wright, supra note 8, at 565-66; Lesnick, supra note 6, at 
581. 
15. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982). 
16. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246. 
17. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 5, 96 Stat. 2527, 2530. 
18. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071 note (West Supp. 1987) (amendments proposed Apr. 20, 1982). 
19. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 & n.18 (1975). In a parallel development a decade before, Congress did 
object to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, forbidding such rules from becoming effective 
without further authorizing legislation. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See 
text at note 283 infra. 
20. See H.R. REP. No. 7154, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4437, 4439. 
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by the Court.21 
Neither the Senate nor the House submitted a report accompany-
ing this legislation, and perhaps for that reason Congress' intervention 
in the rulemaking process has attracted little attention. This congres-
sional action is potentially quite significant, however, for it under-
scores deficiencies in the current process and signals a potential 
decentralization of the rulemaking initiative if those deficiencies stand 
uncorrected. 
On only this one occasion has Congress modified a Supreme 
Court-proposed federal civil procedural rules change or proposed such 
changes of its own. Whether Congress should itself amend Federal 
Rules more often, beef-up or alter the existing Judicial Conference ap-
paratus, delegate the chore to an administrative or independent 
agency, or maintain the status quo raises complex questions of legiti-
macy, conflict of interest, and institutional efficiency. But one thing 
seems certain: Federal Rules oversight under the current regime has· 
sometimes been sadly lacking. The history of judicial efforts to put 
flesh on the skeleton of Federal Rule 15(c) is a notable example. 
II. THE AGONIZING HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE 15(c) 
A. The Principle of Relation Back and Federal Rule 15(c) 
Relation-back rules breathe new life into lawsuits in which the per-
son or entity the plaintiff intends to sue, the "intended defendant," has 
not received personal or precise notice of an action's commencement 
until after the last day of an applicable period of limitations.22 With-
out relation back, amendments changing or adding parties after expi-
ration of a statutory period violate a statute of limitations and one or 
more of its underlying policies.23 
There is substantial agreement about the nature of those policies. 
Foremost is protecting a defendant from claims brought after "memo-
ries have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has 
been lost."24 Subsidiary policies have been termed as: alleviating a po-
tential defendant's economic or psychological insecurity, often styled a 
"policy of repose"; relieving courts of the burden of trying stale 
21. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 5, 96 Stat. 2527, 2530. 
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652, 655 (D. Del. 1950): 
[T]he statute of limitations seems the only reason for the motion [to amend and relate back] 
and for the opposition to it. Without any question of the statute of limitations there could be 
little objection to the amendment and, indeed, if no statute of limitations presented compli-
cations, it seems probable that a new suit would obviate any amendment or desire for it. 
23. Note, Amendments That Add Plaintiffs Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure J 5(c), 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 671, 672 (1982). 
24. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
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claims; penalizing plaintiffs who negligently or intentionally delay the 
filing of their claims; easing the judicial system's caseload by eliminat-
ing old claims; and avoiding the disruptive effect that aged, unsettled 
claims may have on commercial intercourse.25 There is also a wide-
spread consensus that the period specified in any limitations statute is 
essentially arbitrary; this arbitrariness is sometimes said to follow from 
the fact that the statute is a creature of legislation rather than 
adjudication. 26 
Arrayed against these policies are several others which support 
rules allowing relation back. Both the majority and dissent in Schia-
vone recognized that the principle of relation back is consonant with 
the Rules' general goal of promoting decisions on the merits. The Jus-
tices understood that this goal could be frustrated by "mere technicali-
ties."27 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, described rule 15(c) 
as having the principal purpose of "enabl[ing] a plaintiff to correct a 
pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction 
will not prejudice his adversary in any way."28 Rule 15(c) seeks to 
effect a compromise between the conflicting policies of statutes of limi-
tations and modem procedural rqles.29 Its multiple timely notice re-
quirements reflect the drafters' deference to the important goals of 
statutes of limitations, 30 yet its main thrust is to identify circumstances 
that justify relaxation of limitations strictures when necessary to facili-
tate decisions on the merits. 
It is scarcely controversial to hold, with Professors James and 
Hazard, that when a party-changing amendment is made after a limi-
tations period expires, the relation-back problem should "be solved in 
terms of the basic policies served by the statute imposing the limita-
tion. "31 In the same breath, though, these commentators observe that 
"[t]he cases are in hopeless confl.ict."32 A look at the decisions before 
the 1966 amendment discloses the dimensions of the quagmire. 
25. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 218-19 (3d ed. 1985); Note, supra note 
23, at 672 & nn.7-8; Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendmellts, 
57 MINN. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Federal Rule]. 
26. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 85 n.8, cited with approval in Schiavone v. 
Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1015, 1157 n.608 (1982). 
27. 106 S. Ct. at 2383 (majority opinion) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 
(1962)); 106 S. Ct. at 2389 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); see also Note, Federal Rule, supra 
note 25, at 87. 
28. 106 S. Ct. at 2389. 
29. See Note, supra note 23, at 672. 
30. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 87. 
31. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220. 
32. Id. at 220 n.9. 
June 1987) Federal Rule 15(c) 1513 
B. The Original Rule 15(c) 
Before the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938, an amendment of 
any kind was denied relation-back effect if a district judge viewed it as 
stating a "new cause of action." Only if the amendment were consid-
ered a restatement in different form of the originally pleaded cause of 
action would relation back be permitted and the bar of limitations thus 
removed. Predictably, this standard generated a great deal of defini-
tional litigation involving the concept of "cause of action."33 
The original rule 15(c) promulgated in 1938 substituted for the 
"cause of action" standard a different question: Whether the new mat-
ter asserted by amendment arose from the "conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original plead-
ing. "34 While at the time of its adoption it was clearly understood that 
relation back is for the most part of critical importance only when a 
complaint is amended after a limitations period has run, 35 the original 
rule did not refer at all to the applicable period of limitations or iden-
tify what act - filing, service, or something else - was critical to 
timely commencement. Nor did it distinguish amendments that sub-
stantively alter a claim for relief without changing the denomination of 
the defendant from those that substitute a new defendant or merely 
correct the spelling or description of the original defendant. 
The "arising out of" approach did permit courts to measure the 
allegations of the amended pleading against the relatively concrete da-
tum of operative facts, instead of the largely conceptual notion of 
"cause of action." Under this regime, most courts allowed the relation 
back of such amendments on the same terms as any other amendment 
permitted by rule 15(c), that is, whenever the claim asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the transaction set forth in the original 
pleading. Amendments changing the capacity, name, or identity of 
defendants were generally permitted so long as the court judged that 
the intended defendant had received fair notice of the pendency of the 
action through service of the original, defective complaint. Prior to the 
1966 amendment, courts inclined to permit relation back would char-
acterize most such mistakes in the original pleading as mere "misno-
33. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 85-86; Haworth, Changing Defendants in Pri-
vate Civil Actions Under Federal Rule 15(c) - An Ancient Problem Lingers On, 1975 Wis. L. 
REV. 552, 554. 
34. As originally enacted, rule 15(c), entitled "Relation Back of Amendments," read in its 
entirety: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 308 U.S. 
683 (1939). 
35. See note 22 supra. 
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mers."36 So long as the original complaint was timely filed, service of 
an amended summons and complaint correcting such "misnomers" 
was held not to prejudice a defendant - even where the original, de-
fective service was not made, and hence notice not received, until after 
the limitations period had expired. 37 
Indeed, even when a particular amendment was deemed to substi-
tute or add a "new" defendant, federal judges created several equitable 
exceptions to salvage apparently untimely actions. Chief among these 
was the "identity-of-interest" doctrine. This imputed to the intended 
defendant the notice of litigation that had been directed only to the 
original, unintended defendant, if the commercial or other relationship 
between the two was such that notice to one should reasonably be 
viewed as notice to the other. 38 Some courts demurred, however, 
choosing to regard rule 15(c) as simply a restatement of the law that 
had been developed before the Federal Rules.39 These judges were un-
derstandably concerned that a largely unrestrained "transaction or oc-
currence" approach pays insufficient attention to the timeliness of 
notice received by the intended defendant and thus carries the poten-
tial for serious damage to limitations policies. 
C. The First Decade of the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c): To 
What Cases Do Its New Standards Apply? 
It seemed like a good idea at the time. Near the end of the first 
quarter century of Federal Rule 15(c), a number of decisions involving 
federal government defendants applied the rule quite restrictively.40 
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, responding most imme-
diately to these decisions, proposed an amendment to the rule which 
sought to state the requirements of relation back with specificity. But 
the amended rule was flawed at birth, abused during adolescence, and 
has now been mauled at maturity. Since the 1966 amendment, a be-
wildering variety of interpretive problems have vexed the federal 
courts in their attempt to fix the proper scope for relation back. 
The rule that emerged from the Committee's proposal left the for-
36. See, e.g., cases cited in Haworth, supra note 33, at 560.61; see generally Note, Federal 
Rule, supra note 25, at 89·90 & n.29, 112. 
37. See Haworth, supra note 33, at 562 (discussing Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 
1958) (misnomer), and Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1954) (misnomer 
and misdescription)). 
38. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 91-92. 
39. Id. at 89-90. 
40. See cases cited infra note 46; Lemmon v. Social Sec. Admin., 20 F.R.D. 215 (E.D.S.C. 
1957); Florentine v. Landon, 114 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Cal. 1953), modified, 231F.2d452 (9th Cir. 
1955) (cited in Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Proposals far Reform, 77 HARV. L. REV. 40, 45 n.15 (1963)). 
June 1987] Federal Rule 15(c) 1515 
mer rule41 intact as the first sentence of an expanded whole. In its 
entirety the new rule reads as follows: 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An 
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates 
back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided 
by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in 
by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action 
that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, 
and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against 
him. 
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or 
his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency 
or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the 
requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United 
States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a 
defendant.42 
The threshold problem concerns the types of alterations in an orig-
inal pleading to which the additional requirements of the new second 
sentence will apply. An amendment changing only the factual or legal 
allegations asserted in the original pleading will be permitted upon a 
simple showing that the "claim ... asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading." This is the sole re-
quirement of rule 15(c)'s first sentence, the surviving part of the 
original rule. 
By contrast, amendments "changing the party against whom a 
claim is asserted" are subject to the elaborated notice requirements of 
the second sentence, added in 1966. As a result, courts continue to be 
plagued under the 1966 amendment with the question of which 
amendments truly change parties defendant. For example, is there a 
change of party when the amendment merely corrects a misspelling or 
misdescription of the party originally named? Should it make a differ-
ence if there exists a person or entity, other than the intended defen-
dant, to which the misspelled or misdescribed name pertains? 
The Advisory Committee's note accompanying the 1966 amend-
ment parenthetically indicates that the party-changing amendments it 
had in mind in the second sentence include those which merely "cor-
41. See note 34 supra. 
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (emphasis added). 
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rect a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant."43 On this view an 
amendment prompted by a misspelling or misdescription that would 
formerly have been characterized as a "mere misnomer" would now 
be governed by the stringent requirements of the second sentence of 
rule 15(c). Those requirements demand that the intended defendant 
receive notice of the institution of the action "within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him." Of course, 
such notice is provided only by service of process, not by filing, and 
many states do not require service before a limitations deadline.44 
Thus a "mere misnomer" easily correctable by an amended pleading 
before 1966 could thereafter be cured with relation-back effect only in 
the relatively unlikely event that the intended defendant received some 
kind of notice of the original action before a limitations period expired. 
If, as the Advisory Committee's parenthetical phrase suggests, a 
court decides that a misdescription or misspelling does work a change 
of parties, it must then grapple with the component requirements of 
the second sentence of rule 15(c). What is the substance of the notice 
and knowledge the intended defendant must have received or gained? 
Through what means must the required notice be given? And, most 
troublesome, by what deadline must that notice and knowledge be 
complete? To approach these questions let us start, in the traditional-
ist mode, with the work of the Advisory Committee. 
The Advisory Committee's note observed that the decisions under 
the original rule were problematic "most acutely in certain actions by 
private parties against officers or agencies of the United States.''45 It 
cited four federal district court decisions issued within the preceding 
eight years that had denied amendments under rule 15(c) where plain-
tiffs had named the United States or a federal agency or department 
instead of the particular federal officer designated by statute as the 
defendant. 46 The Committee observed that the policy of the particular 
federal statutes of limitations at issue would not have been offended by 
allowing amendment, because the United States had been "put on no-
tice of the claim within the stated period . . . by means of the initial 
43. FED. R. C1v. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 
F.R.D. 69, 82 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory Committee note]. 
44. Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 103. A majority of states require only filing, not 
service, before a limitations period expires. See note 230 infra and accompanying text; see also 
Haworth, supra note 33, at 563. 
45. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 82. 
46. Cohn v. Federal Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Hall v. Depart-
ment of Health, Education, & Welfare, 199 F. Supp. 833, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. 
Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25, 27 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541, 
542 (W.D. Mo. 1958). 
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delivery of process to a responsible government offi.cial."47 The Com-
mittee, citing these cases, wrote that "incorrect criteria have some-
times been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful results."48 At the 
same time, it noted that the "relation back of amendments changing 
defendants has generally been better handled by the courts" in actions 
involving private parties.49 
Apparently referring to both the governmental defendant and pri-
vate-party actions described immediately above, 50 the Committee 
stated in summary that its proposed amendment "amplified" rule 
15(c) "to provide a generru solution."51 In language the Supreme 
Court has since relied on to support a strict interpretation of the 
amendment, 52 the Committee then wrote: 
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted re-
lates back if the amendment satisfies the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of 
"arising out of the conduct ... set forth ... in the original pleading," 
and if, within the applicable limitations period, the party brought in by 
amendment, first, received such notice of the institution of the action -
the notice need not be formal - that he would not be prejudiced in 
defending the action, and, second, knew or should have known that the 
action would have been brought against him initially had there not been 
a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. 53 
The pertinent text of the new rule 15(c) conforms closely to the 
foregoing quotation from the Committee's note, with an arguably sig-
nificant exception. The note's phrase "within the applicable limita-
tions period" appears in the amended rule itself as "within the period 
provided by law for commencing the action against him" (with "him" 
referring to "the party to be brought in by amendment"). This lan-
guage, together with the added paragraph designed to provide specifi-
cally for the government-defendant cases, 54 was duly approved in 
succession by the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee, the full 
47. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. The Schiavone plaintiffs read 
these cases somewhat differently. They considered it "virtually certain that notice to the govern-
ment came after the short limitations period, but within the penumbra or grace period for later 
service of process under Rule 4." Brief of Petitioners, Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 
(1986) (No. 84-1839) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). 
48. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. 
49. Id. 
50. By negative pregnant there is another indication in the note that the Committee designed 
its "general solution" for both private-party and governmental defendant cases. The sentence 
following the Committee's detailed description of its test explains that a new, second paragraph 
which the amendment also adds to rule 15(c) applies to the government cases only. 
51. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. 
52. Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986). 
53. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83 (emphasis of the "within" 
phrase added). 
54. See note 50 supra. 
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Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and finally the Congress, 
which failed to veto it within the ninety-day period prescribed by the 
Rules Enabling Act. 55 
The Committee thus "amplified" its general test for relation back 
to cover private- and government-defendant cases without distinction. 
Its note begins by observing: "Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more 
clearly when an amendment of a pleading changing the party against 
whom a claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misno-
mer or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of 
the original pleading."56 That the new test appears designed to ex-
pand the circumstances in which relation back would be allowed is 
indicated by the Committee's critical references to the restrictive gov-
ernment-defendant decisions57 and by its indirect but apparently ap-
proving citation to decisions that had allowed relation back against 
private defendants. 5s 
Admittedly, this introduction to the note could also be read to sug-
gest that the Committee intended to contract the scope of relation 
back in some circumstances in which federal courts had usually al-
lowed it. While the text of the amendment itself applies the relation-
back test only to amendments "changing" the party defendant, the 
parenthetical phrase in the first sentence of the Committee's note sug-
gests that such changes occur even when the originally named defen-
dant is merely misnamed or misdescribed. As observed above, courts 
for many years before the amendment had allowed relation back under 
"misnomer," "misdescription," or "identity of interest" concepts, ap-
plying only the easily satisfied "claim arising out of" test of the origi-
nal rule 15(c). Relation back was frequently approved when the 
original service was made either upon the intended defendant, his 
agent, or a closely related entity, at least where the name endorsed on 
the original complaint was not that of another extant person or corpo-
ration. 59 Indeed relation back was allowed in some of these cases even 
though only filing, and not service of the original complaint, was com-
pleted within the period of limitations. 60 Thus Professor Haworth 
concluded that under the Advisory Committee's parenthetical phrase 
"[a]mendments previously allowed as a matter of course will now be 
SS. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). 
S6. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 82. 
S7. See note 46 supra and accompanying text; see also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, S4 GEO. L.J. 1204, 123S-37 (1966). 
S8. See Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. These private-party deci-
sions are discussed in more detail in text at notes 206-17 infra. 
S9. See Haworth, supra note 33, at SS9-62. 
60. Id. at S62. 
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subjected to a fairly rigorous test, a procedure considerably more strin-
gent than past practice."61 
Still, the only cases which the Advisory Committee pointed to in 
explaining the desirability of an amendment to rule 15(c) were those in 
which it believed relation back had been unfairly denied. Accordingly, 
some courts, concerned lest formerly correctable misnomers would 
now be unamendable under the requirements of the rule's second sen-
tence, continued to handle misnomer or misdescription amendments 
under the loose "arising out of" test of the first sentence. Thus where 
an intended natural person defendant was misnamed, or a defendant 
corporation was misdescribed as incorporated in one state rather than 
another, many courts in the decade after the 1966 amendment contin-
ued to allow the amendment even though the strict requirements of 
the second sentence of rule 15(c) could not be met.62 In the words of a 
contemporary edition of a standard treatise: 
[W]hen an amendment merely involves correcting a misnomer and does 
not entail the actual "changing" of the parties, it should be allowed as a 
matter of course as long as it satisfies the standard in the first sentence of 
Rule 15(c) and without regard to the special requirements of the second 
sentence of the subdivision. 63 
Professor Haworth concluded that "courts are ignoring the Advisory 
Committee's intent [to treat misnomer and misdescription cases under 
the stringent standards of the second sentence] in order to avoid what 
they must consider to be an unduly harsh result."64 Whether this was 
in fact the Committee's "intent," or rather an inference about its in-
tent resulting from sloppy drafting, is an open question. 
Commentators have sought to circumvent the purport of the par-
enthetical phrase by differentiating those misnomers and misdescrip-
tions that actually change the identity of a defendant from those that 
do not. Professors James and Hazard argue for relation back when-
ever the defendant sought to be added by amendment 
was fully aware of the suit from the beginning. This may happen when 
the process mistakenly describes a nonexistent corporate entity but is 
served upon defendant and is actually recognized for what is intended; or 
where the action is mistakenly brought against an existing entity, but the 
wrong one, because substantive liability rests upon another entity closely 
related in financial interest to the first. 65 
61. Id. at 556. See also id. at 561-62. 
62. Id. at 556-58. 
63. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 513 
(1971), quoted in Haworth, supra note 33, at 557 n.23. 
64. Haworth, supra note 33, at 557. 
65. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220 (emphasis added). These scholars were 
confident that in the first-described situation, "the amendment is generally held to relate back." 
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But what is meant by notice "from the beginning"? The Supreme 
Court, in Schiavone, would permit relation back on an "identity of 
interest" rationale only if the intended defendant had been made 
aware of the suit before the expiration of the period of limitations. 66 
Professors James and Hazard apparently contemplate that an action 
may be timely although the intended defendant receives notice of the 
suit, through service of process mistakenly describing a nonexistent 
corporate entity, after a period of limitations expires, provided that the 
complaint was filed before that deadline and the applicable law per-
mits service of process thereafter. Only where the new defendant has, 
before amendment, "really been a stranger to the case" - where she 
has received neither formal nor informal notice of the pendency of an 
action sufficient to alert her to her status as an intended defendant -
would they defer to limitations concerns and deny relation back. 67 
Professor Moore, too, has attempted a general formulation to dis-
tinguish between mere misnomers and changes of parties. His test 
inquires 
whether, on the basis of an objective standard, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the plaintiff had in mind a particular entity or person, merely 
made a mistake as to the name, and actually served the entity or person 
intended, or whether plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different 
person.68 
Read literally, this test plainly errs in focusing solely on p/aintijf 's 
state of mind and thus in trampling unduly on the policies supporting 
statutes of limitations. It ignores the defendant's interest by failing to 
specify some time by which the plaintiff must have carried out the 
original, faulty service. As will be seen, Schiavone makes short shrift of 
such a test. The plaintiffs there did have in mind a particular entity, 
filed a timely complaint, merely made a mistake in naming the entity, 
and actually served an agent of the intended defendant within the pe-
riod the Federal Rules allowed for service of a correctly captioned 
summons and complaint. But they failed to effect service of the defec-
tive summons and complaint on the intended defendant's agent until 
after the limitations period had expired. In the Supreme Court's con-
struction of rule 15(c), that service failed to give notice to the mis-
named intended defendant "within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against him." 
In any event, at least a few courts did apply the relatively unforgiv-
Id. The Supreme Court held otherwise in Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). See text 
at notes 165-228 infra. For a similar test see Cohn, supra note 57, at 1235. 
66. 106 S. Ct. at 2384. 
67. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220. 
68. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 4.44, at 4-418 (2d ed. 1987). 
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ing standards of the 1966 amendment to misnomer or misdescription 
situations, insisting that the intended defendant receive the two kinds 
of notice described by the second sentence of rule 15(c) before the ex-
piration of the limitations period.69 Noting that the main current of 
decision was inconsistent with these results, 70 commentators com-
plained about "varying standards for allowing pleading changes to re-
late back" and concluded "that the attempt by the Advisory 
Committee to eliminate these variations has largely failed"71 and that 
"inconsistent results are still a frequent occurrence."72 
D. The Second Decade of the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c): Does 
the Rule 15(c) Notice Deadline Mean What 
It Appears To Say? 
Despite the rear-guard action of those lower courts that refused to 
apply the strict requirements of the 1966 amendment to misnomers,73 
and the significant scholarly criticism74 of the 1966 amendment as its 
first decade drew to a close, no further amendment was forthcoming. 
The next decade would see not only continued confusion about the 
kinds of alterations to complaints which worked a change of defen-
dants and thus triggered application of the strict requirements of the 
second sentence, but also heightened debate about the meaning of one 
of those requirements, the notice deadline date. 
During the first decade, rule 15(c) was still commonly held to al-
low relation back against intended defendants who would have had 
good limitations defenses in state court. 75 The same result was also 
sometimes reached by different means. When a plaintiff could not sat-
isfy the strict notice requirements of rule 15(c) in a diversity action, 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied instead a more gen-
erous relation-back rule of the forum state, placing higher value on 
preserving the plaintiff's claim than on restoring the defendant's re-
pose.76 But at the dawn of the second decade, in 1978, the Third Cir-
69. See, e.g., Graves v. General Ins. Corp., 412 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1969); People of the 
Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. La. 1968). 
70. See text at notes 62-64 supra. 
71. Haworth, supra note 33, at 559. 
72. Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 96. 
73. See text at notes 62-64 supra. 
74. See Haworth, supra note 33, at 559-62; Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 108-14. 
75. See, e.g., Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1972); Louden-
slager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 
479, 483-85 (6th Cir. 1973). 
76. Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974). But a district court in the First 
Circuit refused to apply the Mulrenin approach in a federal question case. Magno v. Canadian 
Pac. Ltd., 84 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass. 1979). 
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cuit squarely rejected the First Circuit's position that a forum state's 
more liberal relation-back rule supersedes the notice deadline of rule 
15(c).77 This rumbling foreshadowed a more basic disagreement dur-
ing the remainder of the second decade about the meaning of the rule 
15(c) deadline itself. 
For example later in 1978 a creative, if clumsy, opinion of the Sec-
ond Circuit purported to redefine the rule 15(c) notice deadline flexi-
bly in order to avoid the diversity "anomaly" that results when a 
federal court applies a literal definition of the deadline in a state with a 
more relaxed attitude toward the statute of limitations. 78 The anom-
aly is as striking as it is simple: In a state which permits service after 
expiration of the limitations period and requires only filing before-
hand, a strict reading of rule 15(c) "bars relation back for late notice 
to a new defendant when a like notice to the original defendant would 
be timely."79 To pretermit the anomaly, the Second Circuit construed 
the rule 15(c) notice deadline phrase - "within the period provided 
by law for commencing the action against him" - to mean the last 
day of the limitations period plus whatever additional time the forum 
state allowed for service. 80 Two years later, the Fifth Circuit followed 
suit with a similarly expansive interpretation of the 15(c) notice 
deadline. 81 
Subsequently, however, other courts of appeals, confronted with 
mounting caseload pressures, went the other way. In succession the 
Seventh, 82 Eighth, 83 Tenth, 84 Ninth, 85 and Third86 Circuits construed 
the "within" phrase to mean that the intended defendant must have 
received the specified kinds of notice (of the institution of the action 
77. Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978). 
78. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). This 
anomaly was first judicially noticed in a frequently cited district court decision issued shortly 
before the effective date of the 1966 amendment. Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. 
Del. 1965). The anomaly was most recently alluded to, although not specifically addressed, in 
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority in Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382·83. 
79. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383. 
80. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571. The Second Circuit misapplied this test, however, by permit-
ting relation back even though service of process on the intended defendant was completed after 
the 60-day grace period for timely service then permitted by New York law. See text at notes 
109-25 infra. 
81. Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980). 
82. Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982). 
83. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70-71 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing 
relation back because the intended defendant received the prescribed notice from the originally 
served defendant before the limitation period ran). 
84. Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984). 
85. Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1022 (1985). 
86. Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1984), ajfd., 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). 
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and of the probable mistake in defendants) before the limitations pe-
riod had run, regardless of more forgiving rules for timely commence-
ment prevailing in the courts of the forum state. Some of these 
decisions recognized that such strict interpretations of the rule posed 
what the Third Circuit referred to as an "Erie question"87 for federal 
diversity courts in states which permit service after a limitation period 
expires or apply a relation-back rule more flexible than rule 15(c). 
But the full extent of the litigation provoked by the 1966 amend-
ment to rule 15(c) is not reflected in these splits of authority among 
the circuit courts of appeals. To plumb the depths of the confusion the 
1966 amendment spawned, I surveyed the rule 15(c) notice deadline 
decisions of all the federal courts since 1980, when the Supreme Court 
decided Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 88 The Court there held that Fed-
eral Rule 3, which provides that an action is commenced by the filing 
of the complaint, was not intended "to toll a state statute of limita-
tions" but merely to mark "the date from which various timing re-
quirements of the Federal Rules begin to run."89 Having found no 
other federal rule on point, the Court applied a state law on timely 
commencement which required the plaintiff to file and complete ser-
vice of process before the limitations period had run. The Court ex-
pressly declined to reevaluate the suggestion of Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co. 90 that Federal Rule 3 should govern timely 
commencement in federal question cases.91 
Accordingly, Walker, while settling a diversity issue, raised new 
questions about the then-prevailing view that the complaint-filing 
benchmark of rule 3 defines timely commencement in federal question 
actions.92 The House Committee on the Judiciary later took note of 
this remaining interpretive problem,93 but it did not consider any 
amendment to rule 3, either to overturn Walker's diversity holding or 
to address the federal question issue Walker explicitly reserved. Con-
gressional inaction on this point thus left intact the many decisions 
that imbue rule 3 with statute of limitations significance in federal 
question cases, although Walker denies that significance to rule 3 in 
diversity cases. The divergence is a bit bizarre, since nothing in the 
87. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 18. 
88. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
89. 446 U.S. at 750-51. 
90. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
91. 446 U.S. at 751 n.11. 
92. See text at note 144 infra. 
93. See statement by Rep. Edwards of the House Judiciary Committee, commenting on pro-
posed amendments to Federal Rule 4 that were ultimately enacted in 1982. H.R. REP. No. 7154, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4441 n.14. 
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text or history of rule 3 suggests that the filing of a complaint has 
limitations significance under one head of jurisdiction but not the 
other. 
In deciding to focus on the post-Walker opinions interpreting rule 
15(c), I reasoned that the courts would have to confront not only the 
stingy "literal" reading of the notice deadline favored by the emerging 
majority of the court of appeals decisions,94 and the more generous 
reading given by two courts of appeals a few years earlier,95 but also 
the import of Walker. After all, the crux of the difficulty surrounding 
rule 15(c) is whether that federal rule stipulates any constant deadline 
by which the kinds of notice the rule requires must be received by the 
intended defendant. Since Walker holds that no similar deadline is 
declared by Federal Rule 3 (or presumably by any other federal 
rule)96 for the timely commencement of diversity actions against cor-
rectly named defendants, I expected attentive lower federal courts to 
question whether rule 15(c) provides any fixed notice deadline for the 
far rarer situation of relation back. For example, I wondered whether 
the courts would seize on the "against him" language in rule 15(c) as 
indicating that the drafters intended the relation-back notice deadline 
to vary with state law timely-commencement standards, at least in ac-
tions founded on diversity. 
What I found was a bewildering patchwork of seemingly ad hoc 
approaches to the problem reflected in scores of lower court decisions 
issued between 1980 and 1986 alone. The rulemakers' neglect of rule 
15(c) produced abundant jurisprudential casualties. I will portray the 
extent and magnitude of these problems, and the resulting drain on 
judicial resources, in two ways. First, I will discuss the most recent 
body of reported97 diversity and federal question decisions that have 
grappled with the variety of interpretive approaches to the notice 
deadline issue. Second, I will rehearse the painful progress through 
the federal judicial system of Schiavone, which represents the culmina-
tion of two decades of litigation generated by the 1966 amendment. 
1. The Diversity Cases 
Most striking are those decisions that apparently approve the 
94. See cases cited in notes 82-86 supra. 
95. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Kirk v. 
Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussed in text at notes 78-81 supra.) 
96. Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 409 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., 
concurring). 
97. I know of no reliable way to gauge what proportion of the relation-back decisions result 
in opinions or how many such opinions are reported. It is somewhat suggestive, though, that 
some of the opinions cited in the following discussion are reported only unofficially. 
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Martz anomaly98 by denying a plaintiff who has named the defendant 
incorrectly the benefit of a state-law grace period which would have 
been available to serve a defendant named correctly. Some of these 
decisions recognize expressly that this interpretation places a mis-
named defendant in a more advantageous limitations posture than a 
correctly named defendant for no apparent reason. 99 Others do not 
refer directly to the conflict between a strict reading of rule 15(c) and 
more liberal state timely-commencement rules, but the existence of 
such a conflict emerges from the facts. 100 
It may be said in support of these results that they are based on a 
straightforward, if by no means inevitable, 101 reading of the rule 15( c) 
phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action 
against him." But this reading fails to attend to the teachings of 
Walker. It simply assumes that the drafters of the rule intended to 
create a unitary federal definition of timely commencement for rela-
tion-back purposes in the face of Walker's conclusion that rule 3 em-
bodies no similar definition for timely commencement against 
defendants named correctly. Further, this reading of the phrase's sup-
posed "plain language," when juxtaposed with the holding of Walker, 
implements the perverse, unexplained policy of according wrongly 
named defendants the greatest possible measure of repose - even if 
the forum state's own timely-commencement or relation-back rules 
protect them less - while subjecting correctly named defendants to 
the vagaries of state law. 
A second and larger category of the diversity cases consists of 
those which read the "within" phrase strictly without any mention of 
the forum state's timely-commencement or relation-back rules or even 
of the limitations and service dates from which those rules might be 
deduced. 102 These "unrecognized anomaly" cases create a discrep-
98. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 332 (E.D. Mo. 1980). The 
court wrote without explanation that it did "not agree that such a result is necessarily anomalous 
or unfair." 88 F.R.D. at 332. 
100. See Cook v. Starling, 594 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Mcclanahan v. American Gil-
sonite Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1163 (D. Colo. 1980). These actions were filed one 
day before the period of limitations expired, but service on correctly named defendants was not 
made until some time thereafter. The actions were considered timely commenced as against the 
correctly named, but not the added, defendants. 
101. For example, this reading gives no independent significance to the words "against him." 
They may suggest that timely commencement depends on the particular act, such as filing or 
service, by which a given jurisdiction considers a limitations period "tolled." The marker event 
may vary even among states that use a common limitations period. See text at notes 219 & 223 
infra. 
102. See Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984); Norton v. International 
Harvester Co., 627 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1980); Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Aerenson, 603 F. 
Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1985); Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984); 
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ancy between the treatment of correctly and wrongly named defen-
dants only in forum states that afford a post-limitations grace period, 
but all of them rest on a wooden reading of the 15(c) deadline phrase 
and ignore the import of Walker. 
By contrast, other courts found several ways around the seemingly 
literal interpretation of the rule 15(c) deadline date. That is, they al-
lowed the relation back of amendments that added defendants who 
first received notice that an action was pending against them only after 
a limitations period expired. Some courts in this group reached this 
result by heeding the implications of Walker, allowing relation back 
whenever the intended defendant received the prescribed notice within 
a grace period authorized by the "tolling" (actually, timely-com-
mencement)103 provisions of a forum state. 104 Others reached the 
same generous result without regard to timely-commencement provi-
sions of state law. They construed the rule 15(c) notice deadline date 
to include that "reasonable" time after filing which, until 1983, federal 
courts had typically allowed for service of process under the then-pre-
vailing interpretation of Federal Rule 4;105 or they treated the filing of 
the complaint as affording some sort of "constructive notice"; 106 or 
they simply ignored whether the intended defendant received notice 
before a limitations period expired. 107 Both of the principal routes to 
relaxing the rule 15(c) deadline date - deference to forum state 
timely-commencement rules or reference to the rule 4 requirements 
for timely service of process - have their seeds in the Second Circuit's 
confused opinion in Ingram v. Kumar. los 
Mahinpour v. Smith, 35 Fed R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 403 (D.D.C. 1982); Swiss v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
559 F. Supp. 621 (D.R.I. 1982); Davis v. Cadwell, 94 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1982); Greenfield v. 
Kanwit, 87 F.R.D. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
103. Strictly speaking, "tolling" refers to any suspension of the running of the statute of 
limitations, whether occurring before or after the period begins to run. "Commencement" has 
been confusingly defined as "the activity that permanently tolls the statute oflimitations." Note, 
Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations in Federal Court: Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. REV. 842, 842 n.2 (1981). It is somewhat more illuminating to 
consider commencement as the particular event, usually filing or service, which a jurisdiction 
requires to have been completed before, or within a stated time after, the last day of the period of 
limitations. 
104. Hunt v. Broce Constr., Inc., 674 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1982); Florence v. Krasucki, 533 
F. Supp. 1047 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
105. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); 
Calabretta v. National Airlines, 528 F. Supp. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
106. Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Silva v. American 
Home Assurance Co., 36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
107. Sounds Express Intl. Ltd. v. American Themes & Tapes, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 694 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
108. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). 
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2. The Hydra-Headed Ingram Model 
The Ingram opinion meanders through most of the loose analytic 
dead ends to which rule 15(c) decisions have led since the 1966 
amendment. Perhaps Ingram struck the Second Circuit as an appeal-
ing vehicle for expansively interpreting the 15(c) deadline date because 
the originally served and intended defendants had unusual, identical 
last names and unusual, almost identical first names. 109 Yet they were 
geographically separated and had no known connection, so that ser-
vice on the originally named defendant could not reasonably be said to 
have afforded any notice to the intended defendant. In any event, 
although the action was filed two weeks before the limitations period 
expired, service was not made upon the intended defendant until al-
most four months thereafter. 
The court started by assuming, on the authority of its decision ten 
years earlier in Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 110 that the mere fil-
ing of a complaint commences a federal diversity action for statute of 
limitations purposes even if timely service of process is required in the 
forum's own courts. 111 Sylvestri was arguably in conflict with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 112 which had held that federal courts sitting in diversity 
must follow the timely-commencement rules of the forum state. 
Sylvestri in effect prophesied that the Supreme Court's intervening de-
cision in Hanna v. Plumer, 113 which declared in broad terms the supe-
rior authority of virtually every applicable federal rule over 
inconsistent state law, would ultimately demand the overruling of 
Ragan. By finding rule 3 not on point, and thus leaving state timely-
commencement provisions as the only remaining source of law, the 
Supreme Court in Walker proved that prophecy false. 
The question the Second Circuit faced in Ingram was whether the 
mere filing of a complaint timely commences an action even where the 
plaintiff has named the wrong defendant and service on the intended 
defendant is made only after the statute has run. Although the court 
noted that rule 15(c) was amended in 1966 "to establish criteria that 
would lead to more uniform and equitable results," 114 it resisted the 
109. The original defendant was named "Dr. Vijaya N. Kumar"; the intended defendant was 
named "Dr. Vijay S. Kumar." 585 F.2d at 567. 
110. 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968). 
111. 585 F.2d at 568. 
112. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
113. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
114. 585 F.2d at 569 (citing Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 407-10 (1967)). 
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temptation to let the plaintiff off the hook by classifying the case as a 
"mere misnomer" and hence allowing relation back pro forma under 
the first sentence of subsection (c). 115 In particular, the court es-
chewed "mere misnomer" analysis because the intended defendant 
knew nothing of an aborted attempted service upon the misnamed 
defendant and had received no notice himself until several months af-
ter the statute had run. 116 
Turning to the heart of the matter, the meaning of the 15(c) notice 
deadline phrase, the court then seemed to advocate deference to the 
forum state's timely-commencement rule as a way of avoiding the 
anomaly of Martz v. Miller Brothers Co. 117 In this vein the court con-
demned a "literal interpretation" of the deadline phrase as 
unjustified in jurisdictions where timely service of process can be effected 
after the statute of limitations has run. In those jurisdictions, even an 
accurately named defendant may not receive actual notice of the action 
against him prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Yet there 
is no doubt that the action against him is timely commenced. There is 
no reason why a misnamed defendant is entitled to earlier notice than he 
would have received had the complaint named him correctly. 118 
115. When, as here, the mistaken complaint names an actual person or entity in existence, 
it is not obvious whether the amendment corrects a "misnomer" or brings in a truly "new" 
party. Analysis of "relation back" under these circumstances is better accomplished 
through application of the specific guidelines in the second sentence of Rule 15, than by 
attempting to draw an arbitrary line between misnomers and changes of party. 
585 F.2d at 570. 
In support of this point, the court relied on the "weight of authority" as exemplified by six 
cases. 585 F.2d at 570 n.7. These decisions allowed relation back upon concluding that the 
intended defendants had received the notice required by the second sentence of rule 15(c). 
Wynne v. United States ex rel. Mid-States Waterproofing Co., 382 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Construction Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103 (10th 
Cir. 1967); Horwitt v. Longines Wittnauer Watch Co., 388 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975); Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 564, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Davis Water & Waste Indus. 
v. Jim Wilson, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp. 
478 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The majority might have added to this list Craig v. United States, 479 F.2d 
35 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973) (disallowing relation back because the 
notice the intended defendant received did not meet the second-sentence standards). 
Examination of the cited cases, however, discloses that only two, Wynne and Brittian, were 
"true" misnomer cases in the sense that the intended defendant, although misnamed, was the 
entity first actually served. It is not surprising that the plaintiffs in each of the four other cases 
were required to meet the difficult standards of the second sentence of rule 15(c), since their 
proposed amendments changed defendants by almost any standard. But it is not apparent why 
the four remaining cases constitute significantly weightier authority than the four other cases and 
the treatise statement cited by the court earlier in the text which had approved the relation back 
of misnomers under the far more lenient "claim arising out of" test prescribed by the first sen-
tence of rule 15(c). 585 F.2d at 570 (citing Armijo v. Welmaker, 58 F.R.D. 553 (D. Ariz. 1973); 
Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 856 (W.D. La. 1971); Wentz v. Alberto 
Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969); Fricks v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 
46 F.R.D. 31, 32 (N.D. Ga. 1968); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1498, at 513-
14). 
116. 585 F.2d at 571. 
117. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965); see notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. 
118. 585 F.2d at 571 (footnote omitted). 
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The court fortified this interpretation by referring to a criticism of the 
Martz case, written one year after the rule 15(c) amendment went into 
effect, by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, who had been a reporter for the 
Advisory Committee in 1966.119 
The state-deference approach, which the court thus approved for-
mally, had the virtue of fulfilling the apparently expansive intent of the 
1966 rule amenders and of sidestepping the Martz anomaly. Yet the 
court's interpretation is not evident, to put it mildly, from the face of 
rule 15(c). The deadline phrase is' pegged to "the period provided by 
law for commencing the action against him," not "the period provided 
by the law of the forum state (or of some other state to which the 
forum state might refer) for commencing the action against him, in-
cluding any grace period for service of process." Further, this ap-
proach is not well calculated to promote uniformity among the federal 
courts, since the states follow several different patterns for timely com-
mencement.120 Moreover, as a matter of internal consistency, defer-
ence to liberal forum-state law on timely commencement seems 
somewhat at odds with Ingram's adherence to Sylvestri, which lets 
Federal Rule 3 control timely commencement against defendants 
named correctly, notwithstanding contrary rules of the forum state. 
In any event, after charting this state-deference path, the Ingram 
court abruptly left it. It went on to "hold" in the next paragraph that 
under Rule 15(c) the period within which "the party to be brought in" 
must receive notice of the action includes the reasonable time allowed 
under the federal rules for service of process. We think this interpreta-
tion is permissible and desirable and carries out the beneficent purpose of 
the 1966 amendment.121 
But Federal Rule 4 did not at the time specify any fixed deadline 
within which process must be served. 122 Accordingly, the court ap-
plied twin standards developed by decisions interpreting rule 4(a) and 
rule 41(b), the involuntary dismissal rule, to assess timeliness: it in-
quired whether the Ingram plaintiff had acted diligently to perfect ser-
vice after the statute of limitations expired and whether the defendant 
had been prejudiced by the delay. Under those standards, the court 
119. Kaplan, supra note 114, at 410 n.204. 
120. See text at note 230 infra. 
121. 585 F.2d at 571-72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
122. Effective February 26, 1983, Federal Rule 4 was amended to require that service of the 
summons and complaint must be made upon the defendant within 120 days after a complaint is 
filed. It provides for dismissal of the action without prejudice for failure to meet that deadline, 
absent a showing of good cause why service could not have been completed timely. FED. R. C1v. 
P. 4(j). The question whether this deadline was intended to serve as a marker for statute of 
limitations purposes, or only to address the independent requirement of prosecuting with due 
diligence, is discussed in text at notes 129-30 and in note 147 infra. 
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concluded that the "lapse of several months between the time the error 
was discovered and the time the [intended] defendant was served . . . 
was not so unreasonable as to justify dismissal of the claim," even 
though the delay in service was not "fully explained by the 
plaintiff."123 
The court did not explain why it ultimately defined the 15(c) notice 
deadline by reference to the "reasonable" time that rules 4 and 41 then 
permitted for service of process, instead of by reference to the timely-
commencement law of the forum state. The only evident explanation 
is one the court would probably have been embarrassed to confess: 
application of New York's sixty-day grace period in Ingram would not 
have saved the plaintiff's claim, since the intended defendant first re-
ceive~ notice of the action a full two months after that grace period 
expired. 
The Federal Rules/service of process approach which the Second 
Circuit ultimately applied does largely avoid the Martz anomaly. The 
anomaly would persist only under the few state timely-commencement 
or relation-back rules so open-ended that they would deem an action 
timely commenced against defendants who first receive notice more 
than a "reasonable" time - or now, under Federal Rule 4(j), more 
than 120 days124 - after filing. 125 The court's approach also promotes 
formal - and now, under rule 4(j)'s fixed 120-day service period, ac-
tual - uniformity among federal courts on the question of a relation-
back notice deadline. Further, by sustaining claims of which an in-
tended defendant receives no notice until months after the limitations 
period expires, this approach furthers the apparent liberalizing aims of 
the 1966 amenders. 
But the Federal Rules/service of process approach also assumes, 
oversimply, that the "law" in the phrase "within the period provided 
by law for commencing the action against him" means federal law. It 
thus disrespects the timely-commencement rules of the many states 
that require that the intended defendant be notified of the action ear-
lier than 120 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations.126 
Implicitly Ingram, like Sylvestri, rested on the false prediction that 
Hanna overruled Ragan; the Ingram court therefore somewhat conve-
niently took for granted that state timely-commencement rules may be 
disregarded in the face of a combination of federal rules - 15(c), 4, 
123. 585 F.2d at 572. 
124. See note 122 supra. 
125. An open-ended state law provision of this type is discussed in text at notes 132-33 & 
139-42 infra. 
126. See text at note 230 infra. 
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and 41 - lightly assumed to be "on point."127 Today, this approach 
offends Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 12s by assuming that rule 3 gov-
erns timely commencement in diversity actions. It is also at least indi-
rectly at odds with more recent decisions, including one by the Second 
Circuit itself, 129 which hold that compliance with the 120-day service 
deadline of rule 4(j) merely satisfies a separate requirement for prose-
cuting an action with due diligence and does not by itself commence 
an action timely for purposes of a state statute of limitations.13° 
127. The Second Circuit was by no means alone in erroneously predicting that Hanna beto-
kened the demise of Ragan. See, e.g., c. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF FEDERAL 
COURTS § 59, at 277 (3d ed. 1976); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571, 575-76 
(D.D.C. 1977); Krout v. Bridges, 58 F.R.D. 560, 561 (N.D. Iowa 1973); Comment, A Restrained 
Adherence to Ragan - State versus Federal Rules when Tolling State Limitation Periods in Diver-
sity Actions, 18 S.D. L. REV. 185, 199-200 (1973). 
128. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). See Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co., 690 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 
1982) ("Walker v. Armco Steel has laid to rest the notion that Rule 3 can ever be used to toll a 
state statute of limitations in a diversity case arising under state law."); see also Morse v. Elmira 
Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); Saraniero v. Safeway, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 749 (D. Kan. 
1982). Some courts, however, have distinguished Walker on the ground that the Supreme Court 
explicitly found there that the Oklahoma timely-commencement rule was "an 'integral' part of 
the statute of limitations." Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. Courts following this distinction say they 
would feel bound to adhere to state law if state judicial decisions had declared a timely-com-
mencement rule to be integrally related to a statute oflimitations. See Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983); Walden v. Tulsair Beechcraft, Inc., 96 
F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Foster v. Seattle Tent & Fabric Prod. Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 517 (D. Minn. 1981). At least one commentator has concluded that this distinction 
is spurious, that under Walker state timely-commencement rules govern and Federal Rule 3 does 
not apply regardless of whether the state commencement procedure is considered integrally re-
lated to the limitations scheme as a whole. Note, supra note 103, at 849-50. 
129. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Brown v. Rinehart, 
105 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (treating the statute of limitations defense as distinct from the 
independent objection that plaintiff had failed to complete service within the 120 days required 
by rule 40)); New York State Law Digest, in FED. PROC. L. ED. § 65:43 (1983) (noting that 
service must be completed within the statute of limitations period in diversity actions when that 
is required by the forum state's law; otherwise the action will be dismissed even if that service 
was made within the 120 days specified by rule 4). 
130. The Second Circuit in Morse explicitly rejected the plaintiff's argument derived from 
Sylvestri that rule 4(j) 
effectively adds 120 days to the applicable state statute of limitations if the complaint has 
been filed within the limitations period. This is a dubious proposition at best in light of 
Walker. Moreover, the legislative history of the amendments shows that Congress recog-
nized the implications of Walker when it considered the amendments to Rule 4(c) and that 
Congress specifically considered and rejected the argument plaintiff now advances. 
752 F.2d at 42 (citing 128 CoNG. REc. H9850 nn.14 & 15) (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of 
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 81, 120 nn.14-15). Rep. Edwards' analysis of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982 states that under new rule 4(j) an action 
should be dismissed "even if service occurs within the 120 day period, if the service occurs after 
the statute of limitations has run." 128 CONG. REC. at H9850 n.15, 96 F.R.D. at 120. 
It is somewhat strange that the Second Circuit, having thus effectively recognized that 
Walker overrules its holding in Sylvestri, has not also reexamined Ingram, as indeed one district 
court in the Second Circuit has suggested it should. A.B. Volvo v. M/V Atlantic Saga, 534 F. 
Supp. 647, 649 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For Ingram, like Sylvestri, ultimately rests on the view 
repudiated by Walker that filing per rule 3 timely commences an action for limitations purposes 
notwithstanding forum-state timely-commencement provisions to the contrary. See text at notes 
126-27 supra. 
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The fundamental interpretive problem underlying Ingram's Fed-
eral Rules/service of process approach is its assumption that there ex-
ists an on-point Federal Rules definition of the rule 15(c) notice 
deadline, a proposition which Walker casts sharply in doubt. Since 
when Ingram was decided that deadline (drawn from rule 4) was the 
protean "reasonable" time after filing, the court's assumption resulted 
in a generous approach to relation back. But the problem is not sim-
ply that the court locates a definitional benchmark in federal rather 
than state law. Complete deference to plaintiff-oriented state law may 
also substantially undermine the concern with the statute of limita-
tions evident in rule 15(c). 
A 1981 district court decision, Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 131 well illus-
trates that point. Plaintiff in a diversity action sought to add three 
defendants almost four years and six months after the applicable limi-
tations period had expired. Responding to defendant's reliance on rule 
15(c), plaintiff pointed to "an unusually liberal [state] relation-back 
rule"132 which categorically permitted party-changing amendments to 
relate back to the original pleading "[w]henever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transac-
tion, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading."133 The state statute after which the rule was patterned had 
been construed to permit relation back whenever "the plaintiff in-
tended to bring it against the party [actually] liable for the injury."134 
The district court found "compelling indicia" that the 1966 
amendment to rule 15(c) was designed "to prescribe a more liberal 
rule of relation-back than some federal decisions had applied in con-
struing the less explicit provisions of Rule 15(c) as it stood before 
amendment." 135 It therefore fashioned a strained, expansive construc-
tion of Federal Rule 15(c) which avoided a direct conflict with the 
even more liberal Massachusetts rule. The court concluded that rule 
15(c), read literally, "states only an affirmative proposition - that an 
amendment changing a party relates back if prescribed conditions are 
satisfied. It does not state the negative proposition that an amendment 
changing a party does not relate back when these conditions are not 
satisfied."136 Because the court doubted that rule 15(c) was "designed 
131. 90 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mass. 1981). 
132. 90 F.R.D. at 429. 
133. MASS. R. C1v. P. 15(c). 
134. 90 F.R.D. at 429 (quoting McLaughlin v. West End St. Ry., 186 Mass. 150, 71 N.E. 317 
(1904)). 
135. 90 F.R.D. at 432. 
136. 90 F.R.D. at 432. 
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to override a more liberal state law provision of relation back,"137 it 
found rule 15(c) inapplicable and concluded that it "should not be 
applied when to do so would give it the practical effect of preempting a 
state relation-back rule that is an integral part of the state's law of 
limitation of actions and is more liberal than the federal rule."138 
In this respect the district court was following in the footsteps of 
its court of appeals, which, in Marshall v. Mulrenin, 139 had reached a 
similar result for a somewhat different reason. The First Circuit gave 
rule 15(c) a more natural reading, under which the action would have 
been untimely because the intended defendant did not receive notice of 
the action until after the limitations period had expired. But the court 
also found that the open-ended Massachusetts relation-back provi-
sion 140 reflected a "discoverable substantive, as distinguished from a 
merely procedural, state purpose."141 It therefore held, notwithstand-
ing Hanna v. Plumer, that the on-point federal rule must yield.142 
Mulrenin has been subjected to sharp scholarly criticism on the 
ground that it improperly sidestepped Hanna's mechanical preference 
for "on-point" federal rules in favor of a relatively subjective Erie 
analysis geared to the perceived intensity of a state's limitations poli-
cies.143 Whatever the merits of this Erie debate, the critics themselves 
unwittingly follow Mulrenin in simply assuming the answer to the fun-
damental question: Does rule 15(c), fairly read, comprehensively stip-
ulate all the standards that govern the relation back of party-changing 
amendments, or must one key component of the rule, the notice dead-
line, be borrowed from state law? While it seems more likely that in 
1966 the Advisory Committee and_ the Supreme Court had in mind a 
wholly national approach to the problem, Walker raises a genuine 
137. 90 F.R.D. at 432. 
138. 90 F.R.D. at 433. 
139. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974). 
140. At the time, the Massachusetts relation-back rule was codified in MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
231, § 51 (1959) (amended 1973), which was later replaced by MASS. R. C1v. P. 15(c), at issue in 
Covel. 
141. 508 F.2d at 44. 
142. 508 F.2d at 44. The court explained that the state's substantive purpose was no less 
clear because the legislature had chosen to define timely commencement for relation-back pur-
poses in a separate statute instead of proceeding "within the four comers of the statute of limita-
tions' formal provisions." For other authority on the "substantive" bite of limitations statutes, 
see Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of 
the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 low AL. REv. 15, 59 (1977); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 693, 725-27 (1974). 
143. See, e.g., Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - The Erie Doctrine - State Relation-
Back Provision Found Controlling Over Rule 15(c) - Marshall v. Mulrenin, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
952 (1975); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Statute of Limitations - State Policy -
Relation Back, 9 AKRON L. REV. 199 (1975). 
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question whether rule 15(c) succeeded in expressing such a national 
standard. 
3. The Federal Question Cases 
Several of the approaches taken in the post-Walker diversity cases 
find counterparts in actions based on a federal question. Of course in 
the federal question setting, interpretation of the 15(c) deadline phrase 
is unencumbered by conflicts between federal and state law. Still, the 
fundamental questions have no inevitable answers. First, do the Fed-
eral Rules define timely commencement at all? While the Supreme 
Court held in Walker that rule 3 was not intended as a timely-com-
mencement rule in diversity cases, the Court, as mentioned above, 144 
explicitly refused to rule on Ragan's suggestion that rule 3 filing suf-
fices to "toll" a statute of limitations in suits to enforce rights under a 
federal statute. Second, if rule 3 filing does have a tolling effect, 
should the federal courts adopt it as the event that will satisfy the rule 
15(c) relation-back deadline, or should they interpret the rule 15(c) 
notice phrase to demand service of process before the limitations dead-
line, with the resulting restrictive consequences? 
On the surface it seems bizarre for lower federal courts to view rule 
3 as a timely-commencement rule for federal question cases, given 
Walker's holding that the same rule was not so intended for diversity 
cases. In terms rule 3 draws no distinction between the two heads of 
jurisdiction, and the Advisory Committee's note concerning rule 3 
sheds no additional light on this point. The lower federal courts, how-
ever, have apparently dismissed this problem as a pedantic quibble. 
The pre-Walker tradition of using rule 3 as a "tolling" rule for federal 
question cases has survived Walker largely intact. The vast majority 
of courts faced with the question have simply observed that Walker 
did not explicitly reject the view that rule 3 tolls statutes in federal 
question cases.145 Indeed, even the few courts that have insisted that 
both filing and service be completed within the period of limitations 
144. See text at note 91 supra. 
145. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834 (D.V.I. 
1984); Wells v. City of Portland, 102 F.R.D. 796 (D. Or. 1984); Prather v. Raymond Constr. 
Co., 570 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Robbins v. Marine Transp. Lines, 531 F. Supp. 14 
(D.N.J. 1981); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see also 2 
J. MOORE, supra note 68, ~ 3.09[2]; Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 
4 (Elf. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 101 (1983). 
All but one of these cases was "commenced" - that is, the complaint was filed - before 
February 26, 1983, the effective date of rule 4(j). That explains why these decisions conclude 
that the intended defendant need only receive notice within a "reasonable time," rather than 120 
days, after filing. In the action commenced after rule 4(j) became effective, the intended defen· 
dant received notice within 120 days after filing, so rule 4(j) would not have changed the result. 
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for timely commencement of a federal question action apparently 
rested their decisions on the belief that such service was implicitly re-
quired by the particular federal statute at issue, rather than by rule 
3.146 
Even after Walker, then, filing under rule 3147 timely commences 
federal question actions against correctly named defendants. It is 
therefore not surprising that many post-Walker federal question deci-
sions have also allowed relation back under rule 15(c) against mis-
named defendants who were first notified of the commencement of 
actions only after a limitations period expired.148 What is somewhat 
surprising is that roughly as many courts have come out the other 
way. 149 These courts, including most of the courts of appeals that 
have addressed the point, read the rule 15(c) deadline phrase literally. 
They require that some form of notice of the institution of the action 
be communicated to the intended defendant before the federal limita-
146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ralston Purina Co., 599 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (action 
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)); see also 
Ralston Purina Co. v. Barge Juneau & Gulf Caribbean Marine Lines, 619 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 
1980) (admiralty action). The latter case may not survive the Fifth Circuit's decision handed 
down six months later in Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980). 
147. Rule 4U) has held no appeal as an alternative measure of timely commencement in cases 
based on federal questions. As in the diversity cases, see text at notes 129-30 supra, rule 4(j), 
which requires that service of process be complete within 120 days after filing, has been viewed 
solely as a rule regulating diligent prosecution. See, e.g., Porter v. Beaumont Enter. & Journal, 
743 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1984) (assuming that the facts warranted a rule 4U) dismissal without 
prejudice, they also warranted a dismissal with prejudice for failure to satisfy a federal statutory 
period of limitations); Burks v. Griffith, 100 F.R.D. 491 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing action 
without prejudice under rule 40) but noting that any attempt at refiling would be met with a 
successful challenge under a state period of limitations borrowed in a federal civil rights action). 
Professor Moore has gone so far as to suggest that even if filing alone tolls a statute of limitations, 
and a complaint is timely filed, a subsequent "dismissal under Rule 4U) will result in the action 
being time-barred ifthe statute has run after the filing of the complaint." 2 J. MOORE, supra note 
68, ~ 4.46, at 4-435. See generally Siegel, supra note 145, at 107-08 (noting the problem but 
suggesting no definitive answer). 
148. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980); Allen v. Bolger, 597 F. Supp. 482 
(D. Kan. 1984); Maiden v. Biehl, 582 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murray v. United States 
Postal Serv., 569 F. Supp. 794 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); United States ex rel. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. G.H. 
Coffey Co., 100 F.R.D. 413 (D. Me. 1983); A.B. Volvo v. M/V Atlantic Saga, 534 F. Supp. 647, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Swann Oil, Inc. v. MIS Vassilis, 91 F.R.D. 267 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Bush v. 
Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Hart v. Bechtel Corp., 90 
F.R.D. 104 (D. Ariz. 1981); cf Turner v. Winn Dixie, Inc., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1443 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (adopting the reasonable time approach of Kirk v. Cronvich, but finding on the 
facts that service three weeks after filing and twenty days after the expiration of the limitations 
period was not made within a "reasonable time"). 
149. Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, (9th Cir. 1984); Cooper v. United States 
Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Williams v. United 
States, 711 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Stewart v. United States, 655 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1981); Westfield v. Rhodes-Perdue Furniture 
Co., 109 F.R.D. 106 (W.D.N.C. 1985); Wickfall v. Bolger, 102 F.R.D. 466 (W.D. Tenn. 1984); 
Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Va. 1984); Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 550 F. 
Supp. 1211 (D. Mass. 1982); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982); 
Robbins v. Marine Transp. Lines, 531 F. Supp. 14 (D.N.J. 1981). 
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tions period runs out, even though a correctly named federal question 
defendant would often have to settle for considerably later notice and 
even though no state law demands better notice. Some of the opinions 
recognize expressly that this stingy approach to relation back creates a 
purely federal anomaly: under rule 15(c), the misnamed defendant 
will be entitled to better notice - that is, notice before the limitations 
period expires - than he would be assured by rule 3 had he been 
named correctly. 150 
Still, the slim majority of the reported cases holds, consistent with 
the dominant interpretation of rule 3, that an intended federal ques-
tion defendant is never entitled to notice before the limitations period 
expires, even if he was first named erroneously. This line of decisions 
simply transplants the holding of Ingram v. Kumar to the federal 
question setting. These courts have determined that the rule 15(c) no-
tice deadline includes the "reasonable time" after filing which, until 
rule 4 was amended in 1983, most courts applying Federal Rule 3151 
allowed for completion of service of process. On their facts these fed-
eral question cases are indistinguishable in any significant respect from 
those that demand notice to the intended defendant before the limita-
tions period expires.152 Those courts that allow relation back when 
notice would have been timely against a correctly named federal ques-
tion defendant place greatest emphasis on avoiding a senseless Federal 
Rules anomaly or on furthering the apparent goals of the 1966 amend-
ers. The courts opting for the strict approach express greater concern 
for adhering to the most natural meaning of the critical deadline 
phrase in rule 15(c). 
4. Shuffles and Sidesteps 
Faced with such massive confusion in the decisions about the 
meaning and application of the deadline phrase, and mindful of the 
harsh or merely irrational results attendant upon the state-federal or 
150. See, e.g., Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 724 F.2d 1397, 1402 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(W{lllace, J., dissenting). 
151. I have uncovered no reported decisions which gauge the rule 15(c) notice deadline with 
reference to the rule 4(j) 120-day period for service. Perhaps this is because both rule 4(j)'s 
drafters, see H.R. REP. No. 7154, supra note 20, at 4442, and its judicial interpreters in federal 
question cases, see decisions cited at note 147 supra, have unanimously agreed that rule 4(j) has 
no limitations significance but simply constitutes an independent barrier to the progress of a civil 
action based on inadequate diligence of prosecution. 
152. Most strikingly, compare Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 569 F. Supp. 794 
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (party was "Mary Murray"), with Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 550 F. 
Supp. 1211 (D. Mass. 1982) (party was "Nancy A. Murray") (both actions under Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982)); compare Allen v. Bolger, 597 F. Supp. 482 (D. Kan. 
1984), with Wickfall v. Bolger, 102 F.R.D. 466 (W.D. Tenn. 1984) (both actions under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)). 
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federal-federal anomalies, a number of courts have worked out artful 
dodges. Three approaches will be mentioned briefly. 
Some courts expressly recognize that deference to forum-state law 
might permit relation back even if the intended defendant first re-
ceived notice after the limitations period expired. Rather than resolve 
the potential conflict between state and federal law, these courts rec-
ommend further fact-finding in the hope of learning that the intended 
defendant did receive some sort of notice before the last day of the 
statute of limitations, the earliest possible notice deadline under a.Ily 
interpretation of the rule 15(c) phrase.153 
A second tack was taken by a district court154 sitting in the Third 
Circuit after that circuit had opted for a strict interpretation of the 
deadline phrase in Schiavone. The district court relied on forum-state 
decisions which had estopped intended defendants from invoking the 
statute of limitations when their own fraud or concealment had pre-
vented a plaintiff from discovering their actual identity. Finding such 
inequitable conduct, the court allowed relation back even though the 
intended defendant had first received notice of the institution of the 
action after the limitations period expired. 
The court reasoned that because rule 15(c) explicitly referred to 
the statute of limitations that is "provided by law," the rule implicitly 
"imports into the federal rules the statute of limitations of the forum 
state. It must also therefore import those doctrines [like estoppel] that 
have been judicially created to inform the analysis of statute of limita-
tions problems."155 By a parity of reasoning, one would also expect 
the limitations defense to be informed by state timely-commencement 
and relation-back rules. Yet the Third Circuit in Schiavone had ex-
plicitly refused to allow a liberal New Jersey relation-back rule to in-
form its own interpretation of rule 15(c).156 Thus the district court's 
technique displays a superficial fidelity to the law of the circuit, while 
in fact contradicting the court of appeals' ultimate rationale in order 
to achieve a result the lower court thought just. 
A third approach, also used to skirt apparent Erie problems, 
emerged in a jurisdiction that authorizes "John Doe" pleadings. In 
one diversity action, 157 the forum state's law gave plaintiffs three years 
from an action's commencement to amend their "Doe" complaints to 
153. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1982); Gabriel v. 
Kent Gen. Hosp., 95 F.R.D. 391, 393-94 (D. Del. 1982). 
154. Layton v. Blue Giant Equip. Co. of Canada, 105 F.R.D. 83 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
155. 105 F.R.D. at 86. 
156. Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), a.ffd., 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). 
157. Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2926 
(1986). 
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reflect a defendant's true identity and to effect service of process. For 
limitations purposes, the state courts had considered such a "Doe" 
defendant to be a party to the action from its commencement. Under 
the state procedure, then, the amended complaint adding the defen-
dant's real identity would have been timely; under the circuit's prevail-
ing strict interpretation of rule 15(c), the action would have been time 
barred because the defendant had not received any notice of the insti-
tution of the action within the period of limitations. 
Reviewing the district court's dismissal of the action under rule 
15(c), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals framed the issue as whether 
forum-state law or rule 15(c) "applies."158 The court treated the fo-
rum state's relation-back procedure for "Doe" pleadings as effectively 
extending the underlying period of limitations by three years, and it 
was undisputed that the amended complaint correctly naming the 
defendant was served within that expanded period. The court accord-
ingly considered that no relation-back rule, either state or federal, 
came into play at all. In brief, "the asserted conflict between Rule 
15(c) and state Doe practice is 'bogus.' " 159 
A variation on this approach has been applied in a jurisdiction that 
authorizes use of a fictitious name to identify a defendant whose name 
is then unknown and permits the relation back of amended complaints 
that reflect the defendant's real identity. Case law treated the date of 
filing of the original complaint as the date that interrupts the running 
of the period oflimitations. 160 A federal district court, sitting in diver-
sity, recognized that such an action would be time-barred unless the 
amendment substituting the defendants' correct names were allowed 
to relate back, but it also concluded that relation back was precluded 
under rule 15(c).161 Because the district court was within the same 
circuit that had decided Marshall v. Mulrenin, 162 it was apparently 
bound to hold that a liberal local relation-back law should prevail over 
rule 15(c), since the application of the federal rule would defeat "sub-
stantive state rights." 163 Avoiding such a direct collision between lo-
cal law and rule 15(c), the court achieved the same result by 
concluding that the Federal Rules, including rule 15(c), "do not deal 
158. 780 F.2d at 799. 
159. 780 F.2d at 800-01 (quoting 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509, at 158 (1982)). 
160. E.g., Santiago v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (D.P.R. 1982). 
161. Santiago, 539 F. Supp. at 1152. 
162. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974); see notes 139-43 supra and accompanying text. 
163. Santiago. 539 F. Supp. at 1153 (citing Mulrenin and Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 
427 (D. Mass. 1981)). 
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with the particular problem of John Doe defendants."164 Conse-
quently, the only relation-back law remaining in the picture was the 
local law, under which relation back would revive the "Doe" 
complaint. 
E. Schiavone v. Fortune 
1. The Decisions Below 
This cacophony of conflicting opinions culminated in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Schiavone v. Fortune. 165 Plaintiffs brought suit for 
libel in United States District Court in New Jersey, grounding jurisdic-
tion on diversity. Although plaintiffs intended to sue Time, Inc. for 
allegedly defamatory statements contained in an article published in 
Fortune Magazine, an internal division of Time, the caption of the 
complaint identified the defendant as "Fortune." In the body of the 
complaint Fortune was described as "a foreign corporation having its 
principal offices at Time and Life Building."166 
The complaint was filed ten days before the running of the applica-
ble New Jersey statute of limitations. Mail service was not made until 
one day after the statute ran, however, and the complaint was not re-
ceived by Time's agent for service until three days after that. Time's 
agent forwarded the summons and complaint to Time with accompa-
nying correspondence which reflected the agent's understanding that 
the intended defendant was Time, rather than the nonexistent entity 
"Fortune." Of course, even the agent did not gain this understanding 
until it received the mail service, four days after the limitations period 
had expired. Two months later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint 
which the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court all considered 
adequate to denominate Time as the defendant.167 
Time did not dispute that the action was timely filed under Federal 
Rule 3. It agreed, or at least did not deny, that service upon its agent 
several days after the limitations period ran would have been timely if 
the defendant had been named correctly; service of the original com-
plaint two weeks after filing was not only well within the 120-day pe-
riod specified by Federal Rule 4(j), but also apparently timely under 
the rules that would be applied by a New Jersey court. In effect, Time 
164. 539 F. Supp. at 1153. But see Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d 
Cir. 1977); Sassi v. Breier, 76 F.R.D. 487, 489 (E.D. Wis. 1977), ajfd., 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 
1978) (holding that the standards of rule 15(c) do apply to "John Doe" pleadings). 
165. 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). 
166. 106 S. Ct. at 2381. 
167. 106 S. Ct. at 2381-83, 2385 (majority opinion), 2386-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting), ajfg. 
750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), ajfg. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 71, 73 (D.N.J. 1983). 
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stood on the Martz anomaly. It argued that as a misnamed defendant 
it was entitled to notice of the institution of the action before the run-
ning of the limitations period even though, had it been named cor-
rectly, it would not have been entitled to any earlier notice than it in 
fact received. On this theory Time moved for summary judgment, 
contending that the action was time barred. 
Plaintiffs' response to the motion was initially limited to two argu-
ments. First, they contended that their amendment corrected a mere 
misnomer and did not change a party; the requirements of the second 
sentence of rule 15(c) would therefore be wholly inapplicable. The 
district court acknowledged the difficulty of choosing between these 
characterizations of the amendment but found it unnecessary to decide 
the matter. It relied on the parenthetical phrase from the Advisory 
Committee's note which suggested that the new standards were 
designed to cover all amendments, "including an amendment to cor-
rect a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant."168 Accordingly, 
the court found that the second-sentence standards governed the case. 
Turning to those standards, the district judge then noted "an ap-
parent dispute among the courts" as to whether the rule 15(c) notice 
deadline "includes a reasonable period to effect service."169 Conclud-
ing that the "language of the rule, referring to commencement of the 
action, does not contemplate an added period for service of process," 
the judge added that "[t]he parties have not presented this issue to the 
court."170 He ruled that the amendment could not relate back under 
rule 15(c) because Time had not received notice of the institution of 
the action, through its agent, until several days after the limitations 
period had expired. m 
The court also made short work of plaintiffs' second argument, 
that Time had inequitably masked its true name in the boilerplate of 
the Fortune Magazine masthead. The editorial pages of the issue 
which prompted plaintiffs' complaint stated that Fortune was a regis-
tered trademark of Time, Inc. The court found "no basis to conclude 
that Time, Inc. deliberately misled plaintiffs to believe that Fortune 
was a separate corporation."172 Summary judgment was therefore en-
tered for Time. 
In support of a motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs at last urged 
168. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 (quoting Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. 
at 82 (1966)). 
169. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 n.l. 
170. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 n.1. 
171. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75. 
172. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 76. 
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directly that the court construe the rule 15(c) deadline phrase to in-
clude the "reasonable" time after filing173 which the Second Circuit 
had permitted in Ingram v. Kumar. 174 The district court acknowl-
edged that it had not cited Ingram in its earlier opinion. But the court 
stated that it had considered and rejected the Ingram approach and 
would adhere to the ruling, set out in a footnote of its first opinion, 
that the rule 15(c) notice period ends on the last day of the statute of 
limitations.175 
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that their amended complaint 
should be permitted to relate back under New Jersey law. They cited 
several New Jersey cases that permitted amendments adding new 
defendants to "relate back even though the parties to be added had not 
received notice of the action within the limitations period."176 Plain-
tiffs contended that lower federal court decisions under rule 15(c) 
which had followed the state-deference approach that Ingram es-
poused (but did not actually apply) were consistent with the permis-
sive New Jersey approach and should therefore control. 177 
The court "reluctantly" concluded that it was "bound by the lan-
guage of Rule 15(c) to adhere to its prior ruling."178 It read Britt v. 
Arvanitis, 179 a Third Circuit decision, to hold that one of the New 
Jersey opinions relied on by the plaintiffs interpreted the New Jersey 
relation-back rule as merely a "procedural" one which therefore, by 
force of Hanna v. Plumer, must give way to Federal Rule 15(c). The 
court further wrote that the plaintiffs had "conceded" that the New 
Jersey rulings "are procedural only, not substantive."180 Yet it is not 
apparent from the context of the court's letter opinion that plaintiffs' 
attorney did anything more than prudentially acknowledge the ines-
capable authority of Britt in the Third Circuit. 
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that even if an amendment to cor-
173. In fact, when Schiavone was filed in May 1983 Federal Rule 4(j) allowed only 120 days 
to complete service after filing, not the "reasonable" time allowed under rule 4 before it was 
amended earlier that year. See note 122 supra. 
174. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). See notes 109·25 supra 
and accompanying text for a full discussion of Ingram. 
175. Schiavone v. Fortune, No. 83-1654, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984), reprinted in 
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Appendix A, Schiavone 
v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986) (No. 84-1839) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent] (LEXIS 
Genfed library, Briefs file). 
176. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984). 
177. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10 1984). 
178. Schiavone, No. 83-1654 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984). 
179. 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 800 n.7 
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Third Circuit, in Britt v. Arvanitis, had characterized New 
Jersey's permissive relation-back scheme as "procedural"). 
180. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan.IO, 1984). 
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rect a misnomer works a change of party and thus usually falls under 
the second sentence of rule 15(c), the Advisory Committee contem-
plated an exception for those misnomer cases where the original and 
intended defendant share an identity of interest. 181 The Third Circuit 
found "no support in the rule or the advisory committee note for 
plaintiffs' proffered exception." In its view the exception rested on the 
premise that Time, the intended defendant, derivatively received no-
tice of the action within the deadline specified by rule 15(c). Relying 
on the Advisory Committee's note, the court identified that deadline 
as "the [end of the] applicable limitations period." The only notice 
Time had received before the limitations period expired, the court 
found, was that litigation "might ensue," and rule 15(c) plainly re-
quired notice of the actual "institution of the action." Time had there-
fore not received the prescribed notice within the period limited by 
rule 15(c).182 
Like the district court, the court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ment based on Ingram v. Kumar that the notice deadline should be 
extended to include the time ordinarily permitted by state or federal 
law for service of process. On this point the court found the language 
of the rule "clear and unequivocal, requiring that notice to the defen-
dant occur within the statutory period. While we are sympathetic to 
plaintiffs' arguments, we agree with the defendant that it is not this 
court's role to amend procedural rules in accordance with our own 
policy preferences."183 
Plaintiffs, citing Erie and Walker, continued to press their position 
that rule 15(c), even if interpreted to deny relation back, should yield 
to the more generous relation-back rule of the forum state. The Third 
Circuit declined to address that argument on the merits, relying en-
tirely on plaintiffs' purported "concession" that the "New Jersey rule 
was procedural only."184 The court admitted that this concession was 
"irrelevant to the proper interpretation of New Jersey law" but found 
it "dispositive of plaintiffs [sic] argument on appeal."18S But plaintiffs' 
"concession" may in fact have only acknowledged the authority of 
Britt v. Arvanitis. Since Britt was decided before Walker, 186 which in-
directly raised some doubt whether rule 15(c) is "on point" in fixing a 
181. Schiavone, 150 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1984). 
182. 750 F.2d at 18. 
183. 750 F.2d at 18. 
184. 750 F.2d at 18. 
185. 750 F.2d at 18·19. 
186. Britt was decided in 1978, Walker in 1980. 
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notice deadline, the court's disposition of this argument in effect signi-
fies its unwillingness to reexamine Britt in light of Walker. 
2. The Supreme Court Majority's Opinion 
Plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari. Time's brief in opposition urged that an expansive defini-
tion of the rule 15(c) notice deadline was "properly the subject of the 
rule-making, and not the adjudicative process."187 That proposition 
can be questioned. For example, even without further rulemaking, the 
Supreme Court could have accepted the expansive interpretation the 
plaintiffs sought - at least for diversity actions in states that would 
allow relation back - by placing a Walker gloss on the ambiguous 
language of the notice deadline and attending to the apparent purposes 
of the 1966 amenders. 188 In any event, Time's argument rings some-
what hollow as applied to a federal rule that had been manhandled 
through two decades of judicial ministrations without ever gaining the 
attention of the rulemakers. 
Six Justices of the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black-
mun, began by paying homage to the Rules' overarching goal, ex-
pressed in rule 1, of securing ·~ust, speedy, and inexpensive" 
determinations, and to the particular mandate of rule 8(f) to construe 
pleadings "so ... as to do substantialjustice."189 The Court also reaf-
firmed its previous pronouncement "that the spirit and inclination of 
the rules [have] favored decisions on the merits, and rejected an ap-
proach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep may be 
decisive."190 Accordingly, the Court might have been expected to 
spurn an interpretation of rule 15(c) that defeats a plaintiff's entire 
claim because her lawyer makes a pleading mistake, the correction of 
which still affords a misnamed defendant fully as much notice as he 
would be entitled to in federal question and most diversity cases had 
he been named correctly. 
Ultimately, however, the majority was persuaded that the "plain 
language" of rule 15(c) demands notice to the intended defendant 
"within the applicable limitations period" - the phrase from the Ad-
visory Committee's note. The Court acknowledged that this deadline 
187. Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 7. 
188. Time itself quoted Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969), to the effect that existing 
judicial interpretations of a federal rule can be altered if the court, "on conventional principles of 
statutory construction ... can properly conclude that the literal language or the intended effect 
of the Rules indicates that this was within the purpose of the draftsmen or the congressional 
understanding." Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 19. 
189. 106 S. Ct. at 2383. 
190. 106 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)). 
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reflected "an element of arbitrariness" but observed that arbitrariness 
is "a characteristic of any limitations period. . . . [I]t is an arbitrari-
ness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process." 191 
Indeed, the majority wrote that the rule 15(c) phrase "within the pe-
riod provided by law for commencing the action against him" was so 
clear that the Court did not even face "a choice between a 'liberal' 
approach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a 'technical' inter-
pretation of the Rule, on the other hand. The choice, instead, is be-
tween recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides in plain 
language."192 
In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the Court compounded 
neglectful rulemaking with slipshod adjudication. It buttressed its 
strict reading of the deadline phrase through an exercise in selective 
citation. The Court wrote that the "commentators have accepted the 
literal meaning of the significant phrase in Rule 15(c) and have agreed 
with the Advisory Committee's Note."193 The accompanying citation 
quoted a statement contained in the 1985 supplement to a noted trea-
tise coauthored by Professor Wright, to the effect that the intended 
defendant "must have received notice of the action before the statute 
of limitations has run."194 But the Court overlooked the more directly 
relevant view of the same author expressed in another recently pub-
lished work. Professor Wright observes in his federal courts horn-
book195 that a court should pause before applying the rule 15(c) notice 
deadline so as to bar a diversity action which would be considered 
timely commenced under the law of the forum state. In fact, on the 
merits, he advances as "the better view" that "the amendment should 
be allowed, as permitted by state law, even though Rule 15(c) seem-
ingly does not aut~orize it."196 Clearly, this construction is more 
191. 106 S. Ct. at 2385. 
192. 106 S. Ct. at 2385. 
193. 106 S. Ct. at 2385. 
194. 106 s. Ct. at 2385 (quoting c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1498, at 228 
(Supp. 1985)). 
195. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983). 
196. Id. at 383-85. Professor Wright, noting that the Erie problem posed by rule 15(c) "has 
given the courts much difficulty,'' wrote that determination of this question presented a "testing 
case" for the application of Hanna v. Plumer. He explained that since, under Hamza, 
a valid Civil Rule is to be applied without more, [there is] an added burden on the Court and 
those who advise it in the rulemaking process. In formulating a rule the rulemakers must 
now consider the extent to which application of a proposed rule, in cases where state law is 
different, is consistent with the proper ordering of the federal system. 
Id. at 383. He thus concluded that a federal court's application of a more liberal state relation-
back rule would "honor the state's policy decision that a potential defendant's sense of repose is 
not so important as to prevent resolution on the merits of state causes of action simply because of 
an excusable mistake in the denomination of the defendant." Id. at 383-84. In support of this 
view Professor Wright cited several of the decisions that led to the intercircuit conflict Schiavone 
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closely on point than Professor Wright's general guidance about inter-
preting the rule 15(c) notice deadline, which might properly have been 
limited to cases based on federal questions. New Jersey did have a rule 
which, as construed, may well have allowed relation back on the facts 
of Schiavone. Accordingly, it would appear that the Court miscon-
strued one of the authorities upon which it relied in determining how 
much weight to attribute to the "plain meaning" of rule 15(c). 
The Supreme Court also failed to mention the permissive New 
Jersey relation-back law or the resulting Erie issue ultimately ad-
dressed by the district court and decided, however dubiously, by the 
Third Circuit. The Court may have been perfectly justified in declin-
ing to reach the Erie issue. For example, although the order granting 
certiorari was not limited to particular issues, the petitioners' briefs 
stressed only two other points.197 It is precisely such customary con-
straints of the litigation process, however, which make that process so 
unsuited for comprehensive treatment of a problem with so many ten-
tacles - even a problem that calls for nothing more than essentially 
arbitrary solutions.19s 
The Court did allude to Erie problems indirectly. It noted plain-
tiffs' protest against a "procedural 'double standard' " whereby Fed-
eral Rule 15(c) would bar relation back because of "late notice to a 
new defendant when a like notice to the original defendant would be 
timely [under Federal Rule 4(j)]."199 The reference is apparently to 
state timely-commencement rules that deem limitations statutes met 
by filing alone. But the Court made no mention of state rules on rela-
tion back, rules obviously more pertinent to the issue in Schiavone 
than rules about timely commencement against defendants named 
correctly. 
Perhaps the Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, considered the 
Erie question mooted by plaintiffs' "concession." There is at least a 
resolved. Yet Schiavone decides that issue the other way - New Jersey apparently did have a 
more liberal relation-back rule - without even confronting the Erie/Hanna problem. 
197. First, petitioners contended that the initial service of papers naming "Fortune," which 
was concededly timely under Federal Rule 4, should have been deemed sufficient as against Time 
under an identity-of-interest exception, which would render the second sentence of rule 15(c) 
wholly inapplicable. Their fallback position was that even under the second sentence, the dead-
line for giving notice to the intended defendant should have been construed to include the 120-
day period for service provided by Federal Rule 4, as distinct from any grace period allowed by 
the law of New Jersey. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, Schiavone (No. 84-1839) (LEXIS Genfed 
library, Briefs file). 
198. The Court's explicit refusal in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. to decide whether Federal 
Rule 3 provides a timely-commencement definition for federal question cases, see text at note 91 
supra, and the resulting split of authority in applying rule 15(c) to those cases, see text at notes 
145-52 supra, is another illustration of the point. 
199. 106 S. Ct. at 2383. 
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serious question whether reliance on any such concession would have 
been justified even had the concession been plain. The Court's strict 
interpretation of rule 15(c) implicitly overrides the interests of New 
Jersey in its permissive relation-back rule, and those interests presum-
ably cannot be waived by a party.200 The Court's silence on the Erie 
question in Schiavone may reflect its recent inclination to avoid decid-
ing difficult procedural issues by relying on doubtful concessions.201 
In any event, the Court might at least have explained why it ignored 
such an apparently substantial issue fairly raised in both the lower 
courts.202 
As troublesome as the Court's exercise in selective citation is its 
failure to probe the authority which formed the basis of the Advisory 
Committee's statement that the intended defendant is entitled to no-
tice within "the applicable limitations period." Isolating this one 
phrase from a lengthy Advisory Committee note, the Court ignored 
the specific context in which that phrase appears. Earlier in the same 
paragraph the Committee had concluded that in "actions between pri-
vate parties, the problem of relation back of amendments changing 
defendants has generally been better handled by the courts, but incor-
rect criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to 
doubtful results."203 In support of that conclusion, the Committee 
cited, among other works, two popular treatises of the time.204 The 
cited treatise sections reveal precisely which private-party cases the 
Committee considered "better handled," as well as the "incorrect cri-
teria" which it believed had produced "doubtful results." 
From these decisions which the Committee seemingly endorsed by 
incorporation, it appears that the dominant judicial tendency before 
200. In Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), 
the Court distinguished the personal jurisdiction from the subject matter jurisdiction defense on 
the ground that only the former, geared to rights of the individual, is susceptible to waiver. 456 
U.S. at 702-03. I am inclined to place Erie questions, once timely raised, in the category of 
nonwaivable objections, since the federal and state interests competing for dominance in any Erie 
calculus more closely resemble the concerns of subject matter jurisdiction than of the purely, or 
at least largely, individual rights at stake in disputes over personal jurisdiction. 
201. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 & n.10 
(majority opinion), 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1984); Richman, Book Review, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1328, 1339 n.46 (1984); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 689, 702 n.66 (1987). 
202. The Court did say why it rejected plaintiffs' identity-of-interest argument. It found that 
"there was no proper notice to Fortune that could be imputed to Time" because neither Fortune, 
the misnamed defendant, nor Time, the intended defendant, received any notice of the institution 
of the action until after the limitation period had expired. 106 S. Ct. at 2384. 
203. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. 
204. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 451 
(Wright ed. 1960); 1 Id. § 186; 2Id. § 543; 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 15.15 (cum. supp. 
1962). 
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the 1966 amendment was to allow relation back in misnomer or mis-
description situations whenever the intended defendant was likely to 
have received reasonably timely notice of an action against him 
through service of papers denominating him incorrectly. Most impor-
tant, in many of these cases the original, flawed service was not made 
on the intended defendant or its agent until after the period of limita-
tions had expired. Upholding the effectiveness of corrected service af-
ter the limitations period was consistent with the then-prevailing 
understanding that timely commencement of federal actions required 
only filing, provided that service was made within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 205 
The treatise sections the Advisory Committee cited in tum cite 
fourteen relevant decisions. In ten of these, relation back was al-
lowed.206 Yet only one of these ten opinions provides facts sufficient 
to show unequivocally that the intended defendant was served with 
the original, flawed complaint before the last day of the period of limi-
tations. 207 By contrast, in the most recent appellate opinion in this 
group, it is explicit that service of the original, flawed complaint was 
not made before the last day of the period of limitations, and the 
defendants were not served with an amended complaint until a month 
later.208 In other words, the "right party was before the court, 
although under a wrong name,"209 simply because the complaint had 
been filed before the expiration of the limitations period; that filing, 
coupled with notice within a reasonable time after the statute of limi-
tations ran, sufficed for relation back. 
With one exception,210 each of the other opinions that allows rela-
tion back fails to provide facts from which it may be determined 
whether actual notice, through service of the original flawed complaint 
or otherwise, was received by the intended defendant before the last 
205. See Harris v. Stone, 115 F. Supp. 531 (D.D.C. 1953) (for statute oflimitations purposes, 
an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint together with timely delivery of process to 
the United States Marshal). But see note 216 infra. 
206. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958); Grantley v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 
27 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1947); 
County Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1958); 
Sechrist v. Palshook, 97 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. 
Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950); Stevenson v. Richardson County, Neb., 9 F.R.D. 437 (D. Neb. 1949); 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ex rel. Silva v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 357 (D.N.J. 
1948); Bowles v. Underwood Corp., 5 F.R.D. 25 (E.D. Wis. 1945); Bowles v. Marx Hide & 
Tallow Co., 4 F.R.D. 297 (W.D. Ky. 1945). 
207. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ex rel Silva v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 81 F. Supp. at 
357, 358. 
208. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d at 5-7. 
209. 259 F.2d at 5-7. 
210. In Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. at 652, 653, completion of service within 
the limitations period is fairly inferable from the dates mentioned in the opinion. 
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day of the period of limitations. Nevertheless, the courts permitted 
relation back in each case on the theory that the proposed amendment 
sought to correct a mere misnomer or misdescription and that a timely 
filed complaint was served eventually, either before or after the last 
date of the period of limitations.211 The only constant factor in these 
decisions is that the proposed amendments were not perceived as ad-
ding a "new party," which apparently meant a person or entity dis-
tinct from the originally misnamed or misdescribed defendant.212 
The leading case, which the ten decisions quote extensively, is 
United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co. 213 In allowing the relation 
back of an amended complaint which corrected both a misnomer and 
a misdescription, the Fourth Circuit observed that process had been 
served upon an officer of the intended defendant corporation author-
ized to receive service and that no one was misled by the original mis-
takes. The court concluded that if process names or identifies the 
defendant "in such terms that every intelligent person understands 
who is meant ... it has fulfilled its purpose; and courts should not put 
themselves in the position of failing to recognize what is apparent to 
everyone else."214 Again, the court treated simple filing of the com-
plaint as sufficient to permit relation back.21s 
The Advisory Committee may therefore have understood the "ap-
plicable limitations period" to include the reasonable time after the 
expiration of the limitations statute which the Federal Rules then al-
lowed for timely service of a complaint, at least in federal question 
cases.216 The decisions which the Committee apparently approved 
211. Typical of these decisions is Sechrist v. Palshook, 97 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Pa. 1951). It 
cannot be ascertained from the report of that case whether service was made, or any other form 
of notice provided, before the expiration of the limitations period. Nevertheless, because service 
was made (before or after the limitations period expired) on an agent of the intended defendant, 
the court concluded that the amendment merely sought to correct a misnomer of a "party al· 
ready in Court" who had received "adequate notice [whenever given] of the pendency of the 
action" and who therefore "would not be prejudiced in any way" by the relation back of the 
amended complaint. 97 F. Supp. at 506-07. 
212. Three of the four decisions that deny relation back found that the proposed amendment 
would have added a "new party" against whom no action had been timely commenced before the 
limitations period ran. Florentine v. Landon, 114 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Kerner v. 
Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Sanders v. Metzger, 66 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 
1946). In Kerner and Sanders, the courts concluded that the original summons and complaint 
fairly gave notice of an intent to sue only an individual affiliated with a corporation rather than 
the corporation itself. The corporation was correctly named for the first time by an amended 
complaint which was filed after the statute had run. 
213. 162 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1947). 
214. 162 F.2d at 873. 
215. This is implicit in the context of the court's quotation from a treatise, 39 AM. JuR. 
Parties§ 124 (1942), to the effect that relation back should be allowed even if a statute oflimita· 
tions runs after a suit has been commenced by filing. 162 F.2d at 874. 
216. Curiously, and perhaps advertently, none of the opinions discusses Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Ragan held that in a diversity case a forum· 
June 1987] Federal Rule 15(c) 1549 
either explicitly or implicitly equated timely commencement with fil-
ing alone. None suggested that an intended defendant whose name, 
identity, or capacity is corrected by amendment is entitled to any bet-
ter notice than that received by a correctly named defendant whose 
first notice of an action comes through service after a limitations pe-
riod expires.217 
Alternatively, the Advisory Committee's reference to the "applica-
ble limitations period" may simply have reflected its recognition of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Ragan 218 that a federal diversity 
court must apply the state's own definition of timely commencement: 
if a state requires a defendant to be served with process before a limi-
tations period expires, so must a federal district court. Thus the Com-
mittee may have contemplated that in some federal question cases, a 
federal court would use a federal statute of limitations as well as fed-
eral common law to determine whether filing, service, or both are req-
uisite to timely commencement, while in federal question cases for 
which no period of limitations is provided, or in diversity cases, the 
federal court would use state limitations periods together with their 
associated incidents, including state rules of tolling and timely 
commencement. 
On this alternate understanding, the Committee's reference to an 
"applicable" limitations period works hand in glove with the "against 
him" language in the text of the rule 15(c). A given state statute of 
limitations expires on a fixed date after the accrual of a particular 
claim; but with regard to any particular defendant, a diversity suit 
relates back "against him," despite service after that date, if the com-
plaint is filed before service and if filing alone satisfies the forum state's 
rules on timely commencement.219 Or "the period provided by law" 
for purposes of the rule 15(c) notice deadline might be furnished by a 
state's law on relation back rather than its law on ordinary timely 
commencement. Yet another possibility is the measure of timeliness 
used in federal question cases, where lenient federal common law 
state law that requires service of process to be completed before the running of the statutory 
period controls over any contrary implications of Federal Rule 3. See text at notes 90, 112supra. 
217. No good reason has been advanced for conferring more repose on intended defendants 
incorrectly named in an original complaint than on those named correctly. The defendant in 
Schiavo11e advanced the justification that plai11tijfs who have caused flawed process to be served 
at or near the end of a limitations period "are not in the same positions as plaintiffs who have 
sued a properly named defendant within the limitations period; if they were, there would be no 
need for Rule 15(c)." Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 12. This distinction, though, fo-
cuses on the relative equities of plaintiffs, ignoring the focus on defendants which is at the heart 
of the policy of repose. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). 
218. 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see note 216 supra. 
219. Schiavo11e, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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marks filing as the critical event and accordingly allows service within 
any reasonable time thereafter.220 If this is "the period provided by 
law" that supplies the rule 15(c) notice deadline, relation back would 
be as expansive as timely commencement in federal question cases, 
eliminating the federal/federal anomaly; but in many diversity cases, 
relation back would be more expansive than the strict approach to 
timely commencement followed by a significant minority of the states, 
creating a federal/state anomaly just the converse of the one created 
by Schiavone. 
Perhaps, however, the Advisory Committee meant to prefer no one 
of these plausible meanings of "provided by law" over any other, but 
rather to refer to whatever timely-commencement rule would apply to 
the particular kind of case had no naming mistake been made. In 
other words, by using the phrase "the period provided by law" in the 
text of the rule, and by explaining in the accompanying note that this 
phrase denotes the "applicable" period of limitations, the Committee 
may have intended neither the last day of a statu~e of limitations nor 
any universally applicable deadline for giving notice to a misnamed 
defendant. Instead, it may have incorporated for relation-back pur-
poses whatever notice deadline, with or without grace period, would 
control the fate of a limitations defense in the ordinary case of a cor-
rectly named defendant, either under federal law (in federal question 
actions) or the law of a particular state (in diversity actions). In diver-
sity cases, the state law referenced by rule 15(c) could theoretically 
denote either rules about timely commencement or rules about rela-
tion back. On reflection, however, this theoretical ambiguity disap-
pears. Since by hypothesis rule 15(c) would clearly include an 
incorporated (although variable) notice deadline for relation back, it 
should, by force of Hanna, supplant any inconsistent state rule on that 
subject. The rule 15(c) notice deadline therefore would be supplied by 
the state's law on timely commencement. 
Whatever the merits of these several interpretations of "the period 
provided by law," they suggest sufficient ambiguity in the text of rule 
15(c) to draw into question the Court's conclusion that the rule's lan-
guage is "plain." That ambiguity should have led the Court to seek 
interpretive guidance in the specific history of the 1966 amendment 
and in the generally stated goals of the Federal Rules as a whole. 
Bathed in either of those lights, the Court's construction is at least 
doubtful. It expresses more than anything the yearning for a simplicity 
that just isn't there. 
220. See text at notes 145·52 supra. 
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3. The Dissent 
Justice Stevens, writing for three dissenters in Schiavone, first ar-
gued that the amendment substituting "Time, Inc." for "Fortune" did 
not effect a change of party and therefore ought not be tested against 
the stringent requirements of the second sentence of rule 15(c). He 
explained that "the technical correction" made by the amendment 
"added absolutely nothing to any party's understanding of 'the party 
against whom' the claims were asserted."221 Because the plaintiffs had 
alleged in the body of the original complaint that Fortune's principal 
offices were located at Time's place of business, Justice Stevens found 
that "the difference between the description of the publisher of For-
tune in the original complaints and the description of the publisher of 
Fortune in the amended complaints is no more significant than a mis-
spelling" or misdescription.222 
On the assumption that the amendment did change a party and 
that the second sentence of the rule therefore applied, Justice Stevens 
then tackled the meaning of the rule 15(c) deadline phrase. He 
stressed that the words "against him" are crucial because they indicate 
that the notice deadline does not refer just to the last date of the limi-
tations period, but also to any later time provided by state or federal 
law for the action to be "implemented by the service of process."223 In 
this connection he noted that the late Benjamin Kaplan, as reporter 
for the Advisory Committee, had criticized the Martz anomaly in an 
article published a year after the effective date of the amendments. 
Justice Stevens found it curious that the "majority, in relying on the 
Advisory Committee interpretation, ignores the reporter's almost con-
temporaneous understanding."224 
The Schiavone holding is equally vulnerable to the criticism that it 
creates the purely federal anomaly. Service of the original and even 
the amended complaints against Time would have been timely under 
Federal Rule 4(j) if Time had been named correctly; that same service, 
under a strict reading of the rule 15(c) phrase, is held inadequate only 
because Time was named incorrectly. Time's agent understood from 
the outset that plaintiffs intended to sue Time. Thus Justice Stevens 
considered the notice Time received through service of the original 
221. 106 S. Ct. at 2387. 
222. 106 S. Ct. at 2388. 
223. 106 S. Ct. at 2388. From the accompanying footnote, which quotes approvingly from 
Ingram v. Kumar, it appears that Justice Stevens has in mind state rules permitting service of 
process after a limitations period expires. His point seems equally applicable to federal question 
cases, which even after Walker may be timely commenced by rule 3 filing alone. See text at notes 
14546 supra. 
224. 106 S. Ct. at 2389 n.4. 
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complaint, four days after the limitations period expired, "just as 
timely and just as informative as that which would have been received 
[under rule 4(j)] if no mistake had occurred."225 He concluded that 
the notice Time received would not have prejudiced it in maintaining 
its defense on the merits, the ultimate standard expressed in the second 
sentence of rule 15(c).226 
The dissent took the majority to task most strenuously on the 
question of the amenders' intent. The cases which "gave rise to criti-
cism of the Rule and the addition of the second and third sentences of 
its present text," Justice Stevens wrote, were the government-defen-
dant cases in which relation back had been denied - not the private-
party cases in which relation back had been allowed under the loose 
"arising out of" test which then constituted the entire text of the Rule. 
He considered it ironic that "it is the language added by the amend-
ment in 1966 to broaden the category of harmless pleading errors 
which the Court construes today to narrow that category."227 As a 
different majority of the Court was to comment a week later in disap-
proving a court of appeals' construction of the 1963 amendment to 
rule 56(e), "an amendment ... designed to facilitate the granting of 
motions" was thus "interpreted to make it more difficult to grant such 
motions. "228 
F. The Loose Ends of Litigation 
Justice Stevens also identified a loose end that Schiavone leaves 
dangling. He found it quite possible, given the Court's rationale re-
garding the supposed clarity of the deadline phrase, that the Court 
"would enforce an equally harsh construction of the Rule if the scriv-
ener's error had been a mere misspelling, or perhaps a reference to 
Time, Inc. instead of Time, Incorporated."229 This, however, is not 
the most important residual uncertainty about the majority opinion. 
It is not evident that the Court would enforce its narrow reading of 
the rule in all diversity actions or in any actions based on federal 
questions. 
There are three principal patterns of state timely-commencement 
rules. About a third of the states accommodate plaintiffs by treating 
the filing of a complaint, without more, as commencing an action for 
purposes of limitations. These states require only that service be ac-
225. 106 S. Ct. at 2389. 
226. 106 S. Ct. at 2388-89. 
227. 106 S. Ct. at 2389. 
228. Celotex Corp. v. catrett, 106 s. Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
229. 106 S. Ct. at 2389-90. 
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complished within a specified or reasonable time after filing. Roughly 
another third erect requirements only slightly more stringent. In these 
states the plaintiff must not only file the complaint but also issue or 
deliver the summons to a designated officer before the limitations pe-
riod runs; service may still be accomplished afterwards. The remain-
ing states follow the strict approach - the one probably most 
consonant with the principal purposes of a statute of limitations -
which demands that the defendant be served with process (or receive 
some substitute form of notice) before the limitations period 
expires.230 
The conventions of adjudication erode our confidence that the 
Court would want the Schiavone interpretation of the rule 15(c) dead-
line phrase to prevail over the more liberal timely-commencement or 
relation-back rules of a forum state. New Jersey's timely-commence-
ment law was not relied on at all, either in the district court or on 
appeal, and the Supreme Court alluded to the timely-commencement 
anomaly only in passing. Moreover, the Third Circuit, citing a sup-
posed concession by plaintiffs' counsel that New Jersey's liberal rela-
tion-back rule was merely "procedural," ducked that issue altogether, 
and the issue of state relation-back law never resurfaced in the 
Supreme Court. Schiavone therefore leaves for still more litigation the 
question whether rule 15(c), as there construed, should prevail when 
the forum-state law would unquestionably lead to a different result. 
Consider, for example, a diversity case factually on all fours with 
Schiavone, but with the Erie conflict raised squarely and not deemed 
resolved by concession. In Hanna terms, the first question would be 
whether rule 15(c) is "on point." After Walker it is arguable that rule 
15(c) is not comprehensively on point. That rule's definition of timely 
commencement is only somewhat more pointed than that of rule 3, 
and the Court in Walker found that rule 3 does not speak to limita-
tions at all. Nevertheless, Schiavone does find a notice deadline in rule 
15(c), the last date of the period of limitations. 
From the Court's treatment of rule 3 in Walker 231 one would not 
have expected the Court to give rule 15(c) such broad sway. Even 
though rule 3, certainly more than any other federal rule, appeared on 
its face to define filing as the event that would timely commence an 
action against a correctly named defendant, Walker concluded that 
230. Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limitations Where Process is Not Served Before Expira-
tion of Limitation Period, 27 A.L.R.2d 236 (1953 & Supps. 1970, 1978, 1981 & 1987); 54 C.J.S. 
Limitations of Actions §§ 265-68 (1948 & Supp. 1987). These patterns were well established 
when the Federal Rules were first adopted. 2 J. MOORE, supra note 68, § 3.03. 
231. See text at notes 88-91 supra. 
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rule 3 had nothing to say on that subject, at least in diversity cases. 
Yet Schiavone now tells us that a cognate timely-commencement rule 
is implicit in rule 15(c) with respect to defendants who were not cor-
rectly named in the first instance. Putting Walker and Schiavone to-
gether, the Court would have us believe that with rule 3 it did not 
promulgate a general purpose timely-commencement rule for the 
usual case of a correctly named defendant, but that with rule 15(c) it 
did promulgate a timely-commencement rule for the far less common 
occurrence of misnamed or misidentified defendants. 
If the Erie issue were squarely on the table, the Court might con-
tinue to view rule 15(c) as comprehensively on point and therefore, 
under Hanna, dominant over inconsistent rules of a forum state. But 
perhaps, with the matter put directly, the Court might look at the rule 
15(c) deadline phrase more closely, revert to Walker's mode of inter-
preting rule 3, accordingly decide that the rule 15(c) deadline phrase 
no more defines timely commencement for relation-back purposes 
than rule 3 defines timely commencement in the ordinary case, con-
clude that the federal/state clash is illusory, and ultimately hold that 
federal law should borrow state timely-commencement law to fill the 
gap in rule 15(c). 
Next, even if we assume that the Court would continue to consider 
rule 15(c) fully on point, the Erie analysis requires us to ask if rule 
15(c) should nevertheless yield to state law. The Supreme Court has 
not yet subordinated to state policies a federal rule which it has ex-
pressly found to be on point, but the rule 15(c) deadline phrase could 
prove a testing case. 232 It is not controverted that a state's interest in 
the policies underlying the selection of a limitations period is a "sub-
stantive" state concern to which a federal diversity court must de-
fer. 233 Thus the key inquiry would focus on the closeness of the 
relationship between a state's relation-back law and its underlying lim-
itations policies. 
In a related context, the Court itself has twice recently written that 
state "tolling" provisions are inseparable from the limitations periods 
they regulate. The Court has accordingly held that federal courts 
which borrow state limitations periods in federal question cases must 
also borrow state rules on tolling234 and its consequences.235 Further, 
although Walker retrospectively rationalizes the Ragan command 
(that federal diversity courts follow state timely-commencement rules) 
232. C. WRIGHT, supra note 195, at 384. 
233. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
234. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). 
235. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983). 
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as resting on the absence of any federal law to the contrary, this is 
surely revisionist history. A dispassionate reading of Ragan reveals 
that the Court at least assumed that Federal Rule 3 dealt with the 
timely-commencement issue but concluded that stricter state rules 
must prevail because they are so integrally related to the operation of 
underlying statutes of limitations.236 
It is difficult to discern why state relation-back rules are any less 
bound up with basic limitations policy than state rules on tolling or 
timely commencement. Indeed, the rule 15(c) Advisory Committee 
wrote that relation back is "intimately" connected with the policy of a 
statute of limitations. 237 Furthermore, the opposing federal interests in 
a comprehensive relation-back scheme are conspicuously weak: an 
uncertain interest in a uniform rule,238 and a most doubtful interest in 
erecting formidable barriers to relation back. 239 
In other words, the Court could find rule 15(c) comprehensively 
on point and "procedural" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling 
Act240 but nevertheless hold that its early notice deadline must bow to 
more flexible timely-commencement or relation-back rules of a forum 
state. A substantial question remains, even after Hanna, about the 
constitutionality of applying a federal rule so as to trench on deeply 
held state limitations policy.241 The Court might agree that the sub-
sidiary rules regulating the mechanics of limitations decisions form an 
integral part of general state limitations policies. If so, it might further 
conclude that those policies would be substantially undermined by a 
rule 15(c) override, since the Schiavone interpretation would mandate 
the Martz anomaly in the roughly two-thirds of the states that permit 
suits against correctly named defendants who are first notified of law-
suits only after a limitations period runs out. 
The Court would then face the decision whether Schiavone so sub-
236. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 411 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., 
concurring) (noting that state commencement of suit rules are essential components of state limi-
tations schemes). 
237. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. 
238. After Walker, there is no uniform national approach to timely commencement against 
defendants correctly named. It would therefore seem that a uniform notice deadline for the far 
fewer cases raising relation-back problems would achieve only patchwork uniformity in this area. 
239. In the words of a noted treatise, it was not the purpose of rule 15(c) "to raise a limita-
tions bar that is not supported by the underlying state rule." 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
COOPER, supra note 159, § 4509, at 159. To the contrary, the apparent liberalizing thrust of the 
1966 amendment, see text at notes 56-57 & 206-19 supra, and the more general encouragement 
the Rules give to amended pleadings, see FED. R. C1v. P. 15(a), suggest that there is little or no 
federal interest favoring a rigid approach to relation back. 
240. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982). 
241. See note 196 supra. See also Ely, supra note 142, at 726-27 (contending that a federal 
rule prescribing a period oflimitations would offend the Enabling Act's prohibition on rules that 
abridge substantive rights). 
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stantially interferes with these state policies as to invoke Hanna's hy-
pothetical discussion of situations where even an on-point federal rule 
should give way.242 On this question the Court could try to distin-
guish state rules on ordinary timely commencement from state rules 
on relation back. The Court could point out, for example, that the 
divergence between a strict approach to rule 15(c) and more liberal 
state relation-back rules will do less violence to general Erie policies 
than would a divergence between Federal Rule 3 and state rules on 
ordinary timely commencement - if only because relation back/mis-
nomer problems occur less frequently. But that explanation might not 
sit too well. Is it entirely coincidental that the Court bas respected 
state policies when, as in Ragan and Walker, they are conducive to 
strict limitations enforcement but bas disregarded them when, as in 
Schiavone, they have the effect of reviving an action otherwise barred? 
There is somewhat more ground for confidence that the Supreme 
Court would apply the strict Schiavone interpretation to federal ques-
tion cases, despite Schiavone's discontinuity with the prevailing inter-
pretation of Federal Rule 3.243 Applied to federal questions, the 
Court's niggardly linguistic interpretation of Federal Rule 15(c) would 
be unopposed by contrary policies of the states. There would therefore 
be none of the Erie impetus for generous judicial handling of relation 
back that might arguably control this issue in diversity actions in 
many states. Still, since jurisdiction in Schiavone itself rested on diver-
sity, the Court had no occasion to consider such arguments as the 
desirability of relation back to preserve federal question claims. We 
therefore cannot be entirely sure that Schiavone's holding would ex-
tend to cases based on federal law. 
If the Court were to extend Schiavone to federal question cases, an 
action against a correctly named federal question defendant would 
usually continue to be timely commenced by rule 3 filing alone,244 but 
relation back would be available only against those incorrectly named 
defendants who receive the requisite notice before a limitations period 
expires. This haphazard result would echo an existing, even more dis-
turbing discontinuity resulting from the Court's construction of the 
Rules. The Schiavone majority rejected plaintiffs' argument that "the 
period provided by law" in rule 15(c) should be defined with reference 
to the 120-day service period of rule 4 by observing that "Rule 4 deals 
only with process." Instead, the Court borrowed its rule 15(c) gap-
filler from rule 3, observing that "[u]nder Rule 15(c), the emphasis is 
242. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-71. 
243. See text at notes 145-46 supra. 
244. See text at notes 145-46 supra. 
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upon 'the period provided by law for commencing the action against' 
the defendant," and "Rule 3 concerns the 'commencement' of a civil 
action."2~5 Yet "commencement" as used in rule 15(c) has meaning 
only as a component of a limitations scheme, and in Walker the Court 
concluded that rule 3 has no limitations significance whatever - at 
least for actions which, like Schiavone, are founded on diversity. 
III. PRESCRIPTIONS 
A. Rules Versus Decisions 
To observe that Schiavone failed to wrap up these loose ends is not 
to fault the scope of the Court's opinion. Certainly any observations 
the Court might have made about relation back in federal question 
cases could be justly branded as dictum. Rather, Schiavone's failure to 
treat such questions is the inevitable byproduct of an underlying sys-
temic deficiency. The federal judicial system as a whole has failed in 
trying to resolve a multifaceted problem surrounding the interpreta-
tion of an amended federal rule through piecemeal adjudication in-
stead of more rulemaking. 
To be sure, even extensive amendment of the terms of a procedural 
rule will not forestall many potential disputes about its meaning or 
application. These must be addressed, at least initially, through case-
by-case adjudication.246 A recent reporter to the Advisory Committee 
on the Civil Rules suspects that some number of years of experience 
245. 106 S. Ct. at 2385. 
246. Adjudication can finally dispose of some loose ends, but it is ill suited to tie up signifi-
cant numbers of them at once. For example, Schiavone does seem to resolve that rule 15(c) 
requires notice of the actual institution of the action, not merely notice that an action might 
ensue or that a potential plaintiff was asserting a right. 106 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting Advisory 
Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83). This issue, however, was not in great doubt. 
The lower federal courts had already generally agreed that newly named defendants must get 
notice of the institution of the action, not merely of the facts giving rise to litigation. See 
Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 35-36 (10th Cir. 1973); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 
854, 858 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969); Bazzano v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 439 F. 
Supp. 1167, 1171-72 (E.D. Mo. 1977), revd. on other grounds, 579 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1978); see 
also Note, supra note 23, at 682 & n.82. But see Patterson v. White, 51 F.R.D. 175, 177 (D.D.C. 
1970) (noting that defendant had received no timely notice either of the institution of the lawsuit 
or of its involvement with the incident). 
Similarly, by quoting approvingly from the Advisory Committee's 1966 note, the Supreme 
Court made it plain that the required notice "need not be formal." Adequate notice may instead 
reach the intended defendant wholly outside the channels of a lawsuit or, after an action com-
mences, through documents or events other than service of process. See 106 S. Ct. at 2385. This 
proposition, too, enjoyed widespread acceptance among the lower federal courts before Schia-
vone, even by courts adopting the strictest approach to the deadline for the required notice. See 
Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 724 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1984); Trace X Chem., Inc. v. 
Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1983); Longo v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 618 F. Supp. 
87 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Deal v. Cincinnati Milacron Mktg. Co., 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 138 
(S.D. Ga. 1982); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 
Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543 (D. Nev. 1981); Kasko v. American Gage & 
Machine Co., 90 F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Thus neither of these side issues that Schiavone 
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with litigation may be required before it is appropriate to reevaluate a 
rule.247 But there comes a time when the accumulated results of adju-
dication yield diminishing returns. In the case of rule 15(c), that time 
came many years before Schiavone. If, as with rule 15(c), a federal 
rule presents interpretive difficulties that are susceptible of arbitrary 
resolution, I see no good reason to consign still more lawyers and 
judges to wallowing around in the adjudicative abyss when crisp an-
swers are only a statute away. 
I am not predicting the likely outcome of further rule 15(c) litiga-
tion in the wake of Schiavone; while I may be arguing, not too strenu-
ously, that some departures from Schiavone may be desirable, that is 
not the point. The point is that if this procedural morass continues to 
be handled by judicial decision alone, all the potential escape valves 
will continue to invite relitigation. 
The possibility of such relitigation is not chimerical. Since Schia-
vone, one court of appeals has already been called on to decide a rule 
15(c) question far less troublesome than those raised by state relation-
back or timely-commencement provisions more generous than the 
deadline of rule 15(c). The Fifth Circuit, applying Hanna, has now 
held that rule 15(c), which allows for the relation back of transaction-
ally related amendments even if the originally asserted claims were 
time barred when filed, displaces a forum state rule that restricts rela-
tion back to predicate allegations which were themselves asserted 
timely.248 Given the seemingly liberalizing purposes of the 1966 
amendment, it will be even less surprising to encounter challenges to 
the applicability of rule 15(c) when the rigors of Schiavone would deny 
relation back that the forum state's law would allow. 
Quite a few lawyers, confronted with dismissal under Schiavone, 
may be expected to mount heroic and creative efforts to limit its reach 
or carve out exceptions to its rule. This is particularly likely because, 
from the plaintiff's perspective, the alternative to making such argu-
ments is the death of a federal lawsuit. I venture that far fewer law-
yers would succumb to this temptation if a revised rule 15(c) were to 
deal with the principal permutations of the problem that are presented 
by all federal question cases and by diversity actions pending in states 
with flexible rules about timely commencement or relation back.249 
apparently resolved had been seriously controverted. See generally FED. PROC. L. Eo. § 62:321 
(1984). 
247. Arthur Miller Describes Federal Rules Revision Process, Changes in Law School E11viro· 
ment, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1986, at 1, IO (interview with Arthur Miller). 
248. Johansen v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1987). 
249. A preliminary draft of a proposed amendment to rule lS(c) recently considered by the 
Advisory Committee makes progress in this direction. It replaces the "period provided by law" 
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By its very design, a revised federal rule would dictate unitary res-
olutions of entire classes of cases. Those classes, while sharing some 
common characteristics, would admittedly be distinguished by others. 
In this sense it is true that the revised rules, like the existing rules, 
would be subject to condemnation as "arbitrary." But the arbitrari-
ness of the revised, more particularized rules would be no different in 
kind from the arbitrariness of the existing, more general rules; if the 
particularized rules address issues which, like relation back, call pecu-
liarly for arbitrary solutions, the aggregate cost to individualized "jus-
tice" should be easily eclipsed by the incremental gain in predictability 
and efficiency. If, in tum, greater efficiency translates into the speedier 
disposition of some federal civil actions, it should pro tanto enhance 
(assuming constant resources) the federal judicial system's capacity to 
devote greater time and attention to other issues - issues on which 
the investment of time and attention may in fact improve the quality 
of justice. 
B. Rules Reform and Congestion 
The history of rule 15(c) leaves little doubt that a legislative defini-
tion of "within the period provided by law for commencing the action 
against him" would have saved federal judges and their supporting 
personnel a good deal of time. A broader question is whether reinvig-
oration of the federal civil rulemaking process would promote a gen-
eral easing of calendar congestion. Reform is fine, but ultimately the 
game may not be worth the candle unless it addresses the most serious 
and persistent complaint about the federal civil system: judicial delay. 
Of all the issues that contribute to delay in civil litigation, surely 
the least rewarding are those clustered under the general heading of 
procedural litigation. I have in mind here not just the motion practice 
generated by such "substantive" procedurar defenses as personal juris-
diction, venue, service of process, or limitations. Equally capable of 
producing delay are such clearly ancillary matters as the bona fl.des of 
a lawyer's pleading under amended Federal Rule 11 or calculations of 
phrase of the current rule with the "time allowed under rule 4 for service of a summons" in a 
timely filed federal action. The proposal thus stipulates a fixed, 120-day period after filing within 
which the intended defendant must receive the notice specified by rule lS(c). 
It has already been necessary since Schiavone for an appellate court to decide that the lS(c) 
period, which the Committee's proposed amendment would at last precisely prescribe, prevails 
notwithstanding a less generous period prescribed by the relation-back law of the forum state. 
See note 248 supra and accompanying text. The proposed amendment should probably also 
anticipate the mirror-image issue by expressly adding that the Committee favors application of 
the 120-day service period of rule 4 "irrespective of whether state law provides less time or an 
open-ended time for relation back in the courts of the forum state." The last question -whether 
an open-ended state relation-back period prevails over the notice period of rule lS(c) - was the 
subject of litigation even before Schiavone. See text at notes 131-43 supra. 
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reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties, both of which turn on 
a complicated, unprincipled "balancing" of multiple unweighted fac-
tors. It is in this latter realm that Congress (or any legislature) could 
fashion rules which, while necessarily arbitrary (and hence of a char-
acter well suited for legislative mandate), will at the same time pro-
mote the efficient regulation of disputes without palpable harm to 
justice between the parties. 
Further, in intervening on such matters; Congress need not fear 
that it would be poaching on the judicial preserve. On subjects like the 
relation back of party-changing amendments, there is little or no need, 
at least after a point, to hatch substantive policy through case-by-case 
evolution. Nor would legislation on such issues offend the constitu-
tional limits on legislation suggested in Erie, or the parallel prohibition 
of the Rules Enabling Act against rules that abridge, enlarge, or mod-
ify substantive rights.25° Finally, aside from serving the end of effi-
ciency, intervention to clear up a rule like 15(c) might also meliorate 
some of the more obviously absurd diversity wrinkles bequeathed by 
the common law. 
The residue of Schiavone is a disturbing instance of the problem. 
A federal diversity defendant served with process that names and iden-
tifies him correctly, but reaches him after a statute of limitations has 
run, will be subject to liability if (but, after Walker, only if) the forum 
state's law considers suit timely commenced by filing alone. Yet 
Schiavone dictates that this same defendant will elude liability if, fortu-
itously from his standpoint, the original summons misstates his iden-
tity or is mistakenly served on another. The incongruity is even more 
pronounced in timely filed federal question cases, regardless of where 
those actions may be brought.251 A revised rule, although necessarily 
arbitrary, would more likely treat like cases alike. 
Battle-hardened commentators differ sharply about the capacity of 
procedure in general, and rules in particular, to ease congestion or 
delay.252 Judge Weinstein, for example, enunciates the traditional 
250. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); C. WRIClHT, supra note 195, at 383. 
251. Correctly named defendants will be caught (by virtue of the prevailing, post-Walker 
interpretation of Federal Rule 3), while incorrectly named or served defendants will escape (by 
virtue of the likely application of Schiavone). See text at note 244 supra. 
252. A small sample of the burgeoning literature on this subject includes ABA ACTION 
COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT Cosrs AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION Cosrs AND 
DELAY (1984); Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 
(1985); A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO· 
CEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 2-11 
(Federal Judicial Center 1984) (noting the explosion of federal court litigation and attempts by 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States to ad-
dress the problem through federal rulemaking proposals); Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, America/I 
Experiments for Reducing Civil Trial Costs and Delay, 1 C1v. JUST. Q. 151 (1982); T. CHURCH, 
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view that "rulemaking power ... extends the reach of judicial power 
by promoting judicial efficiency and by permitting a single decision -
whether in a case or by a rule - to have a wider impact."253 The 
relative disadvantages of litigation have recently been catalogued as 
follows: "[A] single proceeding can be very expensive and time-con-
suming. . . . [T]he expensive process of formal adjudication may have 
to be repeated in subsequent cases .... [R]ules of conduct extracted 
from an adjudication tend to be considerably less clear in scope and 
content than rules that result-from rulemaking."254 Put more posi-
tively, "the rigors of rule making uniformity can be ameliorated by 
interpretation in adjudication, while the mere existence of a rule will 
forestall many potential cases or provide the basis for summary dispo-
sition of many others."255 
By contrast, Professor Wright, who has been a member of the Ad-
visory Committee's Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, 
reached the "unhappy conclusion" almost twenty years ago that pro-
cedural reform should not be expected significantly to reduce court 
congestion or delay.256 He relied in part on contemporaneous studies 
conducted by the Project for Effective Justice (under the supervision of 
Professor Maurice Rosenberg, an Advisory Committee member), 
which pointed to the lack of evidence that such remedies as the use of 
masters, the pretrial conference, or adoption of a comparative negli-
gence rule had improved judicial efficiency. Indeed, in Professor Ro-
senberg's words, the "chief effect" of procedural devices is "not so 
much to change the speed of the flow of cases through the courts as to 
change their results."257 
This pessimistic view echoes today. Chief Judge Wald of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
citing the report of the ABA Commission to Reduce Court Costs and 
Delay,258 writes that the "legal culture" (more precisely, the culture of 
lawyers) "easily triumphed over such reforms as appointment of more 
A. CARLSON, J. LEE, T. TAN, K. CHANTRY & L. SIPES, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF 
LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL CoURTS (1978). For an earlier look at the "mid-century law 
explosion" and its consequences, see THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LA w EXPLOSION (H. 
Jones ed. 196S) [hereinafter THE COURTS]. 
2S3. Weinstein, supra note S, at 911. 
2S4. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 283-84 
(198S). 
2SS. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. S71, S92 (1970). 
2S6. Wright, supra note 8, at S68, S70, S78, S80, S8S. 
2S7. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS, 
supra note 2S2, at 29, SS, S7. 
2S8. ABA ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, supra note 2S2. 
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judges and promotion of faster timetables. Even the enactment of fed-
eral rules may not solve a problem when lawyers and judges prefer to 
ignore them."259 Her example is the infrequent resort by lawyers to 
the "offer of judgment" provision in Federal Rule 68, whereby a party 
failing to accept an offer in the form prescribed by the rule, and who 
then receives a judgment no more favorable than the terms of the offer, 
becomes liable to the offering party for costs incurred after the offer 
was rejected. Judge Wald describes this rule as having "obvious po-
tential for promoting settlement," but writes that it has, "for some 
reason, never been widely used."260 In a similar vein I suppose one 
could mention that prior to its amendment in 1983 courts seldom in-
voked Federal Rule 11,261 the honesty in pleading rule, and accord-
ingly the judicial system never enjoyed the congestion-easing benefits 
of its sanctions. 
I find this pessimism in part misplaced and in part overstated. Not 
every rule of procedure posits efficiency as its primary or even as any 
goal. The Project for Effective Justice concluded that rules providing 
for discovery were not conducive to settlement.262 At least with the 
hindsight of the past twenty years, we should hardly be surprised that 
the federal discovery process has not helped to draw federal lawsuits 
to speedier conclusions. Dispatch is simply not discovery's main rea-
son for being. Even among the federal civil rules that do seek to 
hasten the pace of litigation, there are mandatory and voluntary vari-
eties, and only the former are reasonably calculated to attain their de-
sired end. 
Judge Wald's example, rule 68, is clearly of the voluntary type. As 
it is now designed, the success of rule 68 will inevitably depend upon 
its acceptance by the "legal culture." Lawyers' lack of acceptance of 
rule 68 may, if anything, suggest that it needs to be refined through 
more rulemaking. Rule 68 has been under repeated attack of late for 
its relatively modest incentives to settle and its failure to offer even 
those incentives to defendants. After decades in which the rule was 
chronically underused, the Advisory Committee and the Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure belatedly advanced a proposal to 
address these deficiencies. 263 
259. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice·Oriented Legal Edu· 
cation, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 35, 37 (1986). 
260. Id. 
261. 5 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1334 (1969 & Supp. 1987). 
262. Rosenberg, supra note 257, at 43. 
263. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concluded that rule 
68 has not provided an effective incentive to encourage settlement, for two reasons. First, unless 
the "costs" allowed by the rule are defined to include attorneys' fees, there is insufficient incen-
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Similarly, rule 11, until its amendment effective August 1983, may 
well have failed to screen out frivolous pleadings because of its serious 
substantive infirmities. As originally written, rule 11 failed to specify 
the nature of the lawyer's honest pleading obligation, left the imposi-
tion of sanctions to the trial court's discretion, and tended to ensure 
that the court's discretion would not be exercised in favor of punishing 
a litigant by specifying only the draconian sanction of striking plead-
ings. 264 Indeed, since rule 11 has been fortified in these respects, the 
advance sheets have been peppered with decisions imposing sanctions 
under the circumstances prescribed by the amended rule. 265 
One distinguished observer concerned with what he calls the 
caseload "crisis" in the federal courts overlooks the salutary potential 
of rules revision altogether.266 Judge Posner eschews some of the most 
sweeping approaches to the litigation explosion (for example the total 
abolition of diversity jurisdiction) but broaches a wide variety of incre-
mental proposals. His immediate "modest and achievable reforms"267 
run a by now familiar gamut which includes assessing attorneys' fees 
against litigation losers, raising the minimum amount in controversy 
tive for settlement. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (Sept. 1984), reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-33 (1985); see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 
8-9 (1985). The Supreme Court was able to remedy this deficiency only incrementally in Marek, 
by defining the rule 68 "costs" shiftable to a claimant-offeree to include attorneys' fees if the 
underlying federal claim-creating statute itself defines attorneys' fees as part of the costs recover-
able by a prevailing party. 473 U.S. at 9. As the Advisory Committee noted when it published a 
tentative draft proposal to amend rule 68, the instances of such federal statutory definitions are 
"rare." 102 F.R.D. at 433-34. 
Second, rule 68 cost-shifting, including such attorneys' fees as are shiftable under Marek, 
works in favor of defending parties only. See Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 93, 121-23 (1986). The Committee proposed that the rule be amended to subject 
all offerees, defendants as well as claimants, to appropriate cost sanctions when settlement offers 
have been unreasonably rejected. 102 F.R.D. at 433, 435. 
The Committee's proposal to amend rule 68 foundered and has now been withdrawn. Con-
gress continues to include attorneys' fees as part of the costs recoverable by a prevailing party 
under selected federal substantive statutes. See, e.g., Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2(B), 100 Stat. 796, 796. These statutes nick away at the incentive 
problem a la Marek but make no headway toward sanctions against defendant-offerees. 
264. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note on amendment effective August 1, 
1983, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201 (1983). For these reasons the Committee concluded 
that "in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses." Id. at 198. 
265. See Oliphant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 739 (1986). The October 1986 newsletter of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools Section on Civil Procedure reports the conclusion or' one study that 335 re-
ported decisions on rule 11 sanction motions appeared between August 1983 and March 1986, 
compared to only 40 between 1975 and 1983. Newsletter of Assoc. of Am. L. Schools, Oct. 1986, 
at 1. See also s. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 6, 45 (Federal Judicial 
Center 1985) (study finding increased willingness by federal judges to impose rule 11 sanctions in 
response to the 1983 amendments). 
266. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 317-21. 
267. Id. at 321. 
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for diversity cases, creating new specialized courts, expanding the ap-
pellate capacity of federal administrative agencies, repealing limited 
classes of federal question jurisdiction, promoting various forms of ar-
bitration, and, most modestly, exhorting the federal judiciary to 
rededicate itself to "the principles of judicial self-restraint and institu-
tional responsibility."26s 
In his search for a solution, Posner chastises the law schools for 
their lack of hospitality to the social scienc~s. Nevertheless, he holds 
out more hope for traditional "disinterested doctrinal analysis" than 
for "critical legal studies," which he feels offers "little payoff in solving 
any of the practical problems of the legal system."269 At least the 
"doctrinal analysts are in a good position to spot some of the growing 
deficiencies of federal judicial performance as a result of caseload 
pressures. "270 
Given these views, it is puzzling that Judge Posner fails to consider 
whether more conscientious monitoring and revision of the Federal 
Rules might also contribute to streamlining federal litigation. He is so 
attuned to efficiency concerns that his discussion of proposals to cur-
tail federal subject matter jurisdiction dwells as much on "externali-
ties" as on flaws in the traditional justifications for diversity.271 Yet 
his exhaustive canvass of remedies to cure the bloated federal judicial 
docket makes no mention of what is theoretically the most direct path 
of all - improving the performance of federal rulemakers. 
Consider the likely scenario had the Schiavone interpretation of the 
second sentence of Federal Rule 15(c) instead been announced by an 
amended rule shortly after the interpretive problems attending the 
1966 amendment first surfaced in the lower federal courts. Lawyers 
probably would not have litigated - today might not dare to, faced 
with amended rule 11 - whether the phrase "within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him" includes the 
additional time for service allowed by a particular forum state. For 
rule 15(c), unlike rules 68 or 11, is not addressed to the mere tactical 
or economic calculations of practicing lawyers or the individualized 
fairness notions of federal district judges. When the requirements of 
rule 15(c) are met relation back is mandatory,272 and if properly re-
268. Id. at 319-20. 
269. Id. at 331. One is inclined to agree with Judge Posner that, on this subject at least, the 
Crits have little to offer. We have not yet realized their vision of a "communitarian" world where 
we can afford for rules to be "the subjects of constant negotiation." Menand, Radicalism for 
Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, 23. 
270. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 330. 
271. Id. at 176-77. 
272. So long as the several requirements of rule 15(c) are satisfied, the party-changing 
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drafted the rule could be virtually self-executing on the question of a 
notice deadline. One may therefore reasonably anticipate that rules re-
vision of this kind would conserve the resources of litigants and the 
federal judicial system. 
C. Who Should Monitor the Rules? 
Schiavone illustrates the built-in conflict the Supreme Court faces 
when it construes a federal rule of civil procedure. With the sole ex-
ception of the 1983 amendments to rule 4,273 these are rules which the 
Court itself once approved and recommended to Congress. One com-
mentator, noting the resulting potential for conflict, has observed that, 
consciously or not, the Court has strained to sustain federal rules in 
cases challenging their validity.274 Indeed, challenges to federal rules 
have resulted in an unbroken string of decisions sustaining them.275 
Most revealing on this point are the Court's own words in Hanna v. 
Plumer. 276 The justices felt obliged to uphold a federal rule because 
they could not conclude that "the Advisory Committee, this Court 
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment" that the rule com-
ported with the Rules Enabling Act and any applicable constitutional 
constraints. 277 
At first blush it would seem that the Court in Schiavone ap-
proached the interpretation of rule 15(c) rather modestly, without re-
gard to the Court's own role as the rule's promulgator. After all, the 
decision is narrow in scope, and it gives the most cramped possible 
reading to the notice deadline phrase. Thus the decision is calculated 
to render relation back available in very few federal cases. But the 
amendment "relates back," and traditionally the matter is not considered to be discretionary 
with the trial court. 
273. See text at notes 16-21 supra. 
274. Lesnick, supra note 6, at 582. See also W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: 
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILmES 75-78 (1981) (terming this lack of "objectivity" the "most fre-
quent and serious argument against the role of the Supreme Court"); Clinton, supra note 142, at 
78; J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 96, 98-99 (1977). Indeed, 
the potential for conflict in the Court's roles as promulgator and construer of the Rules was 
alluded to by the chairman of the original Advisory Committee even before the rules were en-
acted. Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton Pepper (Dec. 19, 1937), 
quoted in Burbank, supra note 26, at 1134 n.530. But cf Clark, supra note 14, at 252-53 (ap-
plauding the Supreme Court's decisions that have upheld challenged federal rules as commenda-
ble judicial "support" for the concept of uniform national rules of procedure). 
275. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (application of rule 35 to plain-
tiffs); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (rule 4(f)); Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) (rule 54(b)); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engg. & 
Foundry Co., 351U.S.445 (1956) (same); Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (applica-
tion of rule 35 to defendants); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (rule 4(d)(l)). 
276. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
277. 380 U.S. at 471. 
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Court also concludes that the deadline phrase has a unitary meaning, 
rather than one that varies with the different periods prescribed by the 
several kinds of available limitations periods "provided by law." Bar-
ring a retreat from Schiavone in the form of the Erie or federal ques-
tion exceptions discussed above, 278 therefore, the net effect of the 
decision is to ensure that the Court's narrow construction of rule 15(c) 
will have the widest possible application. 
Aside from the "inherent dangers in granting rulemaking powers 
to the highest appellate court in a judicial system,"279 there are signifi-
cant practical obstacles to a rules promulgation process dominated by 
the Supreme Court. The primary problem is that the justices are sim-
ply too busy to propose or draft rules changes.280 Since the Judicial 
Code was amended in 1958 to shift primary responsibility from the 
Court to the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court's review of rules 
changes proposed by the Judicial Conference has been relatively per-
functory.281 Professor Friedenthal writes that the Court scrutinized 
rules change proposals more carefully before 1956 when it exercised 
exclusive control over a standing Advisory Committee.282 He views 
the intense congressional dissatisfaction with the proposed Rules of 
Evidence which the Court submitted to Congress in 1972 as a symp-
tom of the Court's declining performance as a rulemaker.283 
The existing process is also attacked on the grounds that the Advi-
sory Committee is unrepresentative of nonelite or nonspecialized con-
stituencies;284 denies meaningful opportunity for public participation, 
for example by holding too few public hearings or making major 
amendments too late in the process to permit effective response;285 and 
fails to discuss fully the reasons behind its major proposals.286 Simi-
larly, Professor Miller, until recently a reporter to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules, speculates that "one of the reasons that 
Congress is very much involved in thinking about federal rule making 
these days is that there have been accusations that it is a closed pro-
cess. "287 Professor Friedenthal asserts that the Advisory Committee, 
278. See text at notes 230-45 supra. 
279. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 675. 
280. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 70-73; Clinton, supra note 142, at 78. 
281. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 99-100; Clintqn, supra note 142, at 77-78. 
282. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 676-77. 
283. Id. at 675-76. 
284. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 64-66; Clinton, supra note 142, at 77; Lesnick, supra 
note 6, at 579-80. 
285. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 51-53; Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 677. 
286. See Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 677; W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 53-54. 
287. Interview with Arthur Miller, supra note 247, at 8. On the "closed nature of the pro· 
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in part because of this isolation, has been "guilty of careless drafts-
manship and ... insufficient analysis and ... the Supreme Court [has] 
failed to remedy these deficiencies before approving" Rules amend-
ments. 288 Other recent commentary has also questioned the efficacy of 
the Rules in reaching their main goals. 289 
One might have expected that these trenchant criticisms of the cur-
rent Court-centered process would have led to calls for a return to 
congressional control. After all, Congress' ultimate constitutional au-
thority to declare procedural rules is now substantially unquestioned; 
the only remaining issue concerns which, if any, delegee body is best 
suited to exercise that authority.29° 
For the most part, these calls have not come from even those crit-
ics most skeptical that the Supreme Court can dispassionately assess 
rules of its own devise. For example, in 1980 Justice Powell, dissent-
ing from the Court's approval of certain amendments to the discovery 
rules, observed that "Congress should bear in mind that our approval 
of proposed Rules is more a certification that they are the products of 
proper procedures than a considered judgment on the merits of the 
proposals themselves."29 1 Professor Friedenthal, notwithstanding his 
several sharp criticisms of the Supreme Court's rulemaking perform-
ance, condemned this dissent as inviting congressional intervention. 
He rejoined that it is "far better to leave procedural reform in the 
hands of the Supreme Court and its advisory committees, whose mem-
bers are chosen for their dedication to the improvement of the judicial 
process, than to rely on elected politicians who must satisfy many con-
stituents on a variety of issues."292 Disturbed by the unseemly pros-
pect of judges advancing their own desired rules changes through 
partisan legislative lobbying, and fearful that pressure from nonjudi-
cial lobbyists will jeopardize proposed reforms,293 he urged the Court 
to reestablish its own firm control rather than permit Congress to fill 
the void. 294 
cess," see Clinton, supra note 142, at 77; see also W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 15, 23, 27, 30; J. 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 101. 
288. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 680 (discussing amendments to FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3) 
concerning the "work product doctrine" of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)). 
289. See generally Holland, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Policy Evaluation, 3 
LAW & POLY. Q. 209 (1981); McKinstry, Civil Discovery Reform, 14 FORUM 790 (1979). 
290. See text at notes 8-11 supra; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 89-90, 104; W. BROWN, 
supra note 274, at 37-39. 
291. Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 
998 n.1 (Apr. 29, 1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
292. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 814-15 (1981). 
293. See Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 673. 
294. Id. at 685-86. 
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This distrust of Congress is prevalent among the Court's critics. 
The rulemaking reform proposals they advance thus leave primary 
rulemaking authority in the hands of the Supreme Court, or confide it 
to the Judicial Conference, or a committee of the Judicial Conference, 
or a congressionally appointed independent commission, rather than 
the Congress itself.29s 
None of these proposals addresses the defect that lies at the heart 
of the history of rule 15( c ): the lack of a systematic monitoring mech-
anism to fulfill the charge of 28 U.S.C. § 331 that the Judicial Confer-
ence "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the 
general rules of practice and procedure." Of course, the very premise 
of this statute may be called into question. Professor Rosenberg, for 
example, argues that it is the rules themselves which often run counter 
to their general goals of promoting just, speedy, and inexpensive litiga-
tion outcomes. 296 He terms a "gallant illusion" the assumption that 
these goals are "attainable by a monolithic set of rules applied to virtu-
ally all the varied types of civil actions filed in the federal district 
courts."297 In his view, "more and 'better' rules may not be the an-
295. Professor Friedenthal urges the Court itself to devote "more diligence" to its review of 
the rules. Id. Professor Weinstein views this suggestion as "unrealistic in view of the Court's 
heavy workload." J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 192 n.382. 
Professor Weinstein would authorize the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro· 
cedure of the Judicial conference to perform the main work of identifying, initiating, drafting, 
and justifying proposed rules changes. Id. at 110-11. This proposal would serve his main goal of 
removing the Supreme Court from the rules promulgation process so that it can judicially review 
civil rules independently and impartially. Id. at 149. Professor Weinstein's specification of the 
Judicial Conference's Standing Committee rather than the Judicial Conference itself is advertent. 
He views the Judicial Conference as "unwieldy and passive" and "heavily dominated by the 
Chief Justice." Id. at 110. See also W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 68-69, 78-79 (noting the 
centralization of rulemaking power in the Chief Justice). Thus Professor Weinstien would have 
the Judicial Conference place its imprimatur on proposals of its Standing Committee so as to 
lend them prestige - the role now performed by the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the Judicial Con· 
ference. The Judicial Conference's final recommendations would go directly to Congress. J, 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 110-11. 
Professor Cramton proposes that a congressional commission initiate new rules, but he would 
have that commission report to the Court or the Judicial Conference rather than to Congress. See 
W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 84. Professor Clinton, while shifting the "burden of inertia" by 
requiring rules change proposals to be submitted as bills "to be enacted through the normal 
lawmaking processes," would give Congress no direct role in the initiation or drafting of rules 
changes. Clinton, supra note 142, at 80. 
Professor Lesnick advocates a "legislative" process through which rules changes would be 
drafted by committees of an independent legislative commission with members to be chosen by 
judges and members of Congress. The Commission's drafts would then be submitted directly to 
Congress, which would engage in "meaningful" review. See Lesnick, supra note 6, at 579-80. In 
form, this proposal more than any other has Congress play the central part in the process. Still, 
Winifred Brown, author of the Federal Judicial Center's comprehensive survey of the current 
rulemaking process, suggests that under Lesnick's system the Commission's proposals "would 
presumably receive less detailed review [by Congress] than do rules promulgated under the pres· 
ent system." W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 83. 
296. Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984). 
297. Id. at 243. 
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swer. Rules require sanctions. Sanctions require enforcement pro-
ceedings. These absorb resources of time, energy, and money that it is 
the very purpose of the rules to spare. "298 Advisory committees labor 
in vain, he writes, when they "strive constantly to meet criticisms of 
the way the rules work by filling their gaps, strengthening their weak 
spots, curing their uncertainties and increasing their precision."299 
Three justices of the Supreme Court have also worried that proposed 
rules amendments often really amount to "tinkering changes" that de-
lay more fundamental reforms. 300 
Experience does teach that the process of changing federal rules is 
"tortuous and contentious."301 With this in mind Professor Rosen-
berg recommends that the Advisory Committee, instead of directing 
"its main efforts to improving rules in which particular flaws have ap-
peared," should attempt "a global evaluation and overhaul of the rules 
as a totality."302 However, as informed by the history of rule 15(c), my 
own tentative view is that there is much that particularized rules revi-
sion can accomplish, that the existing apparatus under the control of 
the Court may be able to accomplish it, and that the process suffers 
most from the absence of a formal, adequately funded mechanism 
within the Judicial Conference for identifying and acting on needed 
proposals for Rules reform. Bringing suitable subjects for improve-
ments in the Rules to the attention of the Advisory Committee may be 
at least as important as the substance of the Committee's deliberations. 
D. Spotting Candidates for Federal Rules Revision 
At the root of the wasteful litigation over rule 15(c) is the lack of 
an effective institutional watchdog. The federal courts cannot fulfill 
that function by themselves. It is ultimately the responsibility of Con-
gress to perform what is, in the end, a legislative function.3°3 
The questions raised by some Federal Rules will of necessity be 
decided, often without opinion, by federal district judges or magis-
trates. Discovery disputes are the classic example. They are rarely 
resolved by final orders eligible for interlocutory appeal, 304 nor do they 
often figure prominently in the review of final judgments. Such ques-
298. Id. at 244. 
299. Id. 
300. Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 
1000 (Apr. 29, 1980) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). 
301. Id. 
302. Rosenberg, supra note 296, at 244-45. 
303. See text at notes 8 & 290 supra. 
304. C. WRIGHT, supra note 195, at 550-51. 
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tions will therefore seldom surface in the courts of appeals and in tum 
will seldom qualify for certiorari review as issues on which those 
courts are in conflict. Even where such squabbles result in published 
opinions, an advisory committee would have to scour the advance 
sheets assiduously to unearth the decisions that signal the desirability 
of reassessing a federal rule. 
Some Federal Rules issues do become the subject of competing de-
cisions at the circuit court level. Occasionally - Judge Friendly's 
opinion for the Second Circuit in Arrowsmith v. United Press Interna-
tionaf 305 is an example - a federal appellate court speaks so articu-
lately or authoritatively that an issue under the Rules which might 
have been expected to generate ceaseless controversy becomes, for all 
practical purposes, settled.306 More typically, though, dozens oflower 
federal courts plough through the murky waters of Federal Rules liti-
gation, hardly speaking to one another. As the history of rule 15(c) 
suggests, at least some of the litigated issues are not worth the costs of 
ongoing judicial debate. 
Moreover, rules-related cases decided by the courts of appeals may 
present issues which fail to impress the Supreme Court with sufficient 
national importance to merit review by certiorari. The saga of rule 
15(c) again provides an example. Justice White, dissenting in 1985 
from the denial of certiorari in Cooper v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, 307 discussed various interpretations of the rule 15(c) notice dead-
line announced by six courts of appeals. 308 Although the split of 
authority Justice White called to the Court's attention had arisen as 
early as 1982,309 it was not until Schiavone that the Court considered 
the issue on the merits. In the meantime many trees gave their lives to 
record the struggles of the scores of lawyers and judges who wrestled 
with the definition of the rule 15(c) deadline. 
305. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (law of the forum state, rather than federal law, governs the 
amenability of nonresident defendants in diversity cases, since F. R. C1v. P. 4 prescribes only the 
manner, not the reach, of service). 
306. The Arrowsmith result has been adopted unanimously by the circuit courts. See cases 
cited in J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 163 n.14 (1985). 
307. 471 U.S. 1022 (1985). 
308. 471 U.S. at 1024. 
309. Compare Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 
(1979) (relation back allowed if misnamed intended defendant served within a "reasonable" time 
after limitations period expires), with Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982) (in· 
tended defendant, the United States, must separately receive notice of suit within the limitations 
period even though originally named defendants, two U.S. government agencies, were timely 
served). Indeed, a related conflict had surfaced as early as 1978, between Marshall v. Mulrenin, 
508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974) (state relation-back rule "substantive" and prevails over federal rela· 
tion-back rule), and Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978) (state statute "procedural" and 
not controlling in federal diversity action). See text at notes 76-78 supra. 
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Even those Federal Rules cases that do come to be heard and de-
cided by the Supreme Court may not settle closely related questions. 
Schiavone and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., which left dangling the 
possibility that Federal Rule 3 does define timely commencement in 
federal question actions, furnish two vivid illustrations. 
Of course the Court itself will sometimes continue to be the first to 
glimpse a Federal Rules interpretive problem, as it sifts through peti-
tions or reviews cases on the merits. When it does, the Court should 
have a mechanism in place for automatically calling the problem to 
the attention of a subcommittee of Congress, the Standing Committee, 
or the Advisory Committee. But some rules-related issues will elude 
Supreme Court scrutiny, and it is important that those issues, too, be 
identified and studied before repetitive litigation yields diminishing re-
turns. If Congress, the Standing Committee, or the Advisory Com-
mittee were to monitor Federal Rules litigation systematically, we 
would not have to count so heavily on the Supreme Court's certiorari 
docket to serve a screening function. 
Because the inner workings of the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules have remained hidden from public view, relatively little is 
known about the sources of proposals for civil rules reform. At least 
in the case of the amendments to the discovery rules effective August 
1, 1980, we know that the primary source of the proposal which be-
came the working basis of the recommendations ultimately approved 
by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court was a study by a 
special committee of the American Bar Association.310 The Commit-
tee's current Reporter, Dean Carrington, advises that the process is 
quite informal. He writes that "[t]he Committee does receive sugges-
tions from judges, lawyers, Congressmen, members of the Standing 
Committee, the Justice Department, the American Bar, local bar 
groups, and perhaps other sources." He adds that "these have some-
times been the subject of close study and response, but not always."311 
It is clear that the burden of identifying needed changes and initi-
ating the amendment process now rests with the advisory committees 
and, especially, their reporters.312 The committees do continually re-
ceive suggestions from varied sources.313 Nevertheless, while it was 
"the original intention and early practice that reporters engage in con-
310. See Friedenthal, supra note 292, at 807 (citing LITIGATION SECTION, ABA, REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977) and id., SECOND RE-
PORT (1980)). 
311. Letter from Dean Paul D. Carrington to the author (Nov. 24, 1986) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
312. W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 59. 
313. Id. at 13, 59 n.139. 
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tinuing comprehensive study of the rules and of their operation in both 
federal and state courts," and "submit periodic reports on all matters 
... such a program of periodic reports based on continuing study has 
not proved achievable."314 
Perhaps the problem is one of resources; the Advisory Committee 
membership may not include enough persons with sufficient time to 
pore over the importance or merits of each proposal received.315 One 
proposal calls for "hiring a full-time secretariat to engage in constant 
oversight and report frequently to the advisory committees."316 
Others recommend the hiring of more reporters and the sponsoring of 
institutes to study, analyze, and discuss the desirability of rules 
changes.317 A more modest suggestion is simply to publicize more 
widely that "the committees are receptive to comments and sugges-
tions at all times - not only in connection with the proposed 
rules."318 
The matter warrants Congress' attention, although obviously that 
attention need not lead to its direct intervention in the rules-drafting 
process. It may suffice for Congress to beef up the resources at the 
Committee's disposal for securing more members or staff by contract 
or hire. Additional personnel should certainly improve the Commit-
tee's bird-dogging capacity; one happy by-product might be improved 
handling of proposals on the merits. The divergence between the 
Committee's apparent intentions when it reshaped rule 15(c) in 1966 
and its ultimate work product suggests that more time and attention 
should be devoted to rules proposals not just at the critical input stage 
but throughout the drafting process. A House-passed bill pending 
before the current Congress319 does address the representativeness320 
and openness321 criticisms of the rules promulgation process and af-
fords Congress at least seven months, instead of three, in which to 
exercise its veto of proposed rule changes.322 Unfortunately, the bill 
provides no additional support to the several advisory committees and 
314. Id. at 12-13. 
315. See id. at 59. 
316. Id. at 59. 
317. Id. at 60. 
318. Id. at 131. 
319. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
320. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) 
(specifying that committees appointed to assist the Judicial Conference shall "consist of a bal-
anced cross section of bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges"). 
321. H.R. 1507, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new U.S.C. § 2073(c) and (d) 
(prescribing, with some exceptions, open meetings and, in addition to official explanatory notes, 
written reports explaining committee action, including minority views). 
322. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a). 
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prescribes no measures that would improve their capacity to monitor 
litigation. 323 
CONCLUSION 
The history of rule 15(c), especially after its amendment in 1966, 
demonstrates that adjudication has proved a wasteful way to resolve 
the ambiguities of that rule. While a few years of common law "con-
versation" may have been necessary to flesh out the infirmities of the 
1966 amendment, the principal interpretive difficulties were fully elab-
orated in appellate court conflicts long before the Supreme Court fi-
nally granted certiorari to resolve a piece of the problem in Schiavone. 
Rules which, like 15(c), treat subjects that are amenable to essentially 
arbitrary solutions can more efficiently be refined by amendment than 
by incremental litigation, with little if any cost to substantial justice. 
Further, the complex of institutions charged with continuous 
study of the Federal Rules, under the aegis of the Supreme Court, has 
not consistently responded in timely fashion to well identified 
problems of this character. Specifically, it would appear that obvious 
candidates for rules revision either do not reach the Advisory Com-
mittee or that the Committee pares its agenda to the bone for lack of 
resources or undisclosed reasons of principle. 
Congress has recently reentered the civil rulemaking arena on an 
ad hoc basis to shape the substance of a proposed Rules amendment. 
It could discharge its fundamental rulemaking responsibility more ef-
fectively by reassessing the amendment process. It should then rede-
sign or reinvigorate the existing institutional machinery to make it 
more responsive to litigation developments that warrant consideration 
of Rules amendments. 
323. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2), 
authorizes the Judicial Conference to appoint committees to recommend proposed rule changes 
or additions. The section then enjoins the Standing Committee to review, for ultimate recom-
mendation to the Judicial Conference, the recommendations that any committees so appointed 
might make. It does not appear that this appointment authorization would alter the existing 
rulemaking process, since the Judicial Conference, without formal legislative authority, has long 
used the advisory committees in just the way that this section describes. See Procedures for the 
Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
102 F.R.D. 413 (1984). 
